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Foreword
The Financial Stability Report (FSR) for Dec 2013 is being released once again in uncertain times. The US Federal Reserve (Fed) having announced tapering of its QE-3 has fi nally laid to rest uncertainties on the timing of the initiation of exit, but the pace of exit and the market reaction and adjustment to the withdrawal of liquidity 
will have to be watched carefully. The commencement of taper should signal a calibrated return to normal liquidity 
and credit conditions in the global markets and also better pricing of risk. This will mean a repricing of certain assets 
with consequent volatility.  In India, a potential additional source of uncertainty is the coming general election.  A 
stable new government would be positive for the economy. With confi dence in the fi nancial system still fragile, six 
years into the crisis, policy certainty is something investors look for in the current environment.
Despite evidence that the outcomes of the recent spells of easing have had diminishing positive effects on 
the real sector, central banks seem likely to continue their easy policies to support asset prices. The global fi nancial 
system appears to have become acclimatized to the current levels of liquidity, so eventual exit  could be disruptive. 
Efforts during the past few months have been directed to make the Indian economy more resilient to the ultimate 
withdrawal of liquidity from the system and less reliant on unstable external capital for growth. The Fed’s 
announcement that it will phase out QE-3 is a welcome signal that conditions have started on the path of 
normalization.
The previous FSR was released at a time of volatility unleashed by the Fed’s announcement of tapering. As 
tapering got postponed, EMDEs like India got time to put their house in order. Macroprudential policy measures 
initiated by the Reserve Bank and the Government have brought some stability to the markets and exchange rate 
volatility has been contained thus far. The current account defi cit has narrowed to sustainable levels. Foreign exchange 
reserves are adequate and fi scal consolidation is in progress. The outlook for the economy has improved, with export 
growth regaining momentum, but growth is still weak. The challenges of containing infl ationary pressures limit 
what monetary policy can do.  To maintain the momentum gained by the respite, it is imperative that long-delayed 
legislative reforms are pushed through, stalled infrastructure project clearances continue and fi scal consolidation 
remains on track.
Non Performing Assets (NPAs) of the banking sector need to be tackled on a priority basis to ensure that they 
do not grow to alarming proportions. The current level of NPAs do not pose a systemic concern as the CRAR of the 
banking system is above the prescribed levels and many projects are just delayed, not unviable.  But we cannot be 
complacent. 
The FSR outlines the macro fi nancial risks to the fi nancial system and brings out the results of a series of 
stress tests on the banking system. The report has an in-depth analysis of the asset quality in the banking system 
and traces the causes leading to the current state of affairs. In addition, the report attempts a study of the 
vulnerabilities in the corporate sector and developments in various market segments. The stress tests assume extreme 
conditions and tail events and show that the fi nancial system in India is resilient to stresses at this point in time 
though continued vigilance is warranted. The report also covers the progress in implementation of post crisis reforms.
The ultimate objective of a stable fi nancial system is to support a vibrant and growing economy and offer easy 
access to fi nancial services across the country to all of its population. The FSR is a useful periodical health check of 
our fi nancial system and I hope this issue once again provides useful inputs to all stakeholders.
Raghuram G. Rajan
Governor
December 30, 2013
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Overview
Macro-fi nancial Risks
Global Economy and Markets
The tapering in the US Federal Reserves’ bond 
purchase programme is set to begin from January 
2014. The initial reaction of fi nancial markets to the 
announcement has been positive, having been 
anticipated and therefore factored-in. Fed’s forward 
guidance on the policy rates has also had a reassuring 
impact. However, fi nancial market volatility will be 
conditioned by the pace of tapering going forward.
Against this background, the interplay of growth-
infl ation dynamics between advanced economies 
(AEs) and emerging market and developing economies 
(EMDEs) (convergence in growth and divergence in 
infl ation) may increase vulnerabilities for EMDEs. To 
reduce spillovers from AE monetary policy 
normalisation, EMDEs will have to strengthen 
national balance-sheets. High global liquidity amid 
persistently low interest rates in AEs has been 
pushing up asset prices.
Domestic Economy and Markets
The delay in tapering allowed India to bring about 
adjustment in the current account defi cit (CAD) and 
build buffers by replenishing its foreign exchange 
reserves. However, macro-economic adjustment is far 
from complete, with persistence of high infl ation 
amidst growth slowdown. Fall in domestic savings 
and relatively high fiscal deficit are other major 
concerns for India. Reviving Fiscal Responsibility 
legislation and a gradual reduction in government 
borrowings can complement financial market 
development and improve confi dence in the economy.
Corporate performance continues to be weighed down 
by boom period expansions and excess capacities, 
amid shifting asset composition towards fi nancial 
investments. House prices and outstanding loans for 
retail housing by housing fi nance companies have 
grown relatively fast during the last few years. 
Inadequate social security coverage in India against a 
backdrop of changing demographics will pose 
challenges for expanding the pension system given 
the fi scal constraints. The NPS was created to serve 
the Government employees and private sector 
workers.
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
Scheduled Commercial Banks
The risks to the banking sector have further increased 
during the past half-year. All major risk dimensions 
captured in the Banking Stability Indicator show 
increase in vulnerabilities in the banking sector. 
Banking Stability Measures, based on co-movements 
in banks’ equity prices, also indicate that the distress 
dependencies within the banking system have risen 
during this period.
Contagion Risks in the Banking Sector
Network tools have been used to assess impact of 
contagion due to risk of credit concentration. Failure 
of a major corporate or a major corporate group could 
trigger a contagion in the banking system due to 
exposures of a large number of banks to such 
corporates. The analysis shows that interconnectedness 
in the banking sector could cause losses due to 
contagion, over and above the direct losses on account 
of the failure of large corporate groups.
Trends in Credit and Deposit Growth
In the recent quarters, credit growth has exceeded the 
growth in deposits. As a result, there has been a 
signifi cant rise in the incremental C-D ratio. 
Asset Quality Concerns
Asset quality continues to be a major concern for 
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs). The key aspects 
of deterioration in asset quality are:
 A rising trend in Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) to 
total assets along with declining trend in 
Coeffi cient of Variation (CV) indicates that the 
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rise in proportion of risky assets in the total 
assets of SCBs is becoming more broad-based.
 The Gross Non-performing Assets ratio of SCBs 
as well as their restructured standard advances 
ratio have increased. Therefore, the total stressed 
advances ratio rose signifi cantly to 10.2 per cent 
of total advances as at end September 2013 from 
9.2 per cent of March 2013.
 The largest contribution to stressed advances 
comes from the PSU banks.
 The ‘medium and large’ sized industries 
contributed more towards stressed advances 
than ‘micro & small’ sized industries.
 Industries recorded the highest share in 
restructured standard advances and with 
relatively high GNPAs contributed the highest 
share of stressed advances in the banks’ loans 
portfolio followed by Services. Retail segment 
fared much better in terms of GNPA and 
restructured standard advances ratios.
 Five sectors, namely, Infrastructure, Iron & Steel, 
Textiles, Aviation and Mining together contribute 
24 percent of total advances of SCBs, and account 
for around 53 per cent of their total stressed 
advances.
To address various issues relating to asset quality, 
Reserve Bank, inter alia, has brought out a discussion 
paper on “Early Recognition of Financial Distress, 
Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair Recovery for 
Lenders: Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets 
in the Economy”.
Stress Tests
Macro stress tests on credit risk suggest that if the 
adverse macroeconomic conditions persist, the credit 
quality of commercial banks could deteriorate further. 
However, under improved conditions, the present 
trend in credit quality may reverse during the second 
half of 2014-15 with the GNPA ratio expected to rise 
initially to around 4.6 per cent by September 2014 
from 4.2 per cent as at end September 2013, which 
may subsequently improve to 4.4 per cent by March 
2015.
Systemic Risk Survey
According to the results of Reserve Bank’s latest 
Systemic Risk Survey, conducted during October 2013, 
global risks and domestic macro-economic risks were 
perceived to be the two most important factors 
affecting the stability of Indian fi nancial system. On 
the domestic macro-economic front, deterioration in 
economic outlook is considered to be the most critical. 
Risk from domestic infl ation, corporate leverage and 
household savings have also increased marginally. On 
the other hand, risks arising from CAD, fiscal, 
sovereign downgrade and infrastructure were 
perceived to have receded.
Regulation of Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Infrastructure
Too-Big-To-Fail and Shadow Banking
India stands committed to the implementation of the 
global regulatory reforms agenda and has made 
considerable progress on this front. Although fi rms 
and markets are beginning to adjust to the regulatory 
approach towards ending too-big-to-fail (TBTF), recent 
research indicates continued expectation of sovereign 
support to such institutions. In India, the process of 
identifi cation of fi nancial conglomerates and their 
joint supervision/ regulation have received a lot of 
attention. Some global reform measures, e.g. those 
related to shadow banking may need to be adopted 
selectively, based on their relevance to the domestic 
fi nancial system.
Money Market Mutual Funds
Due to the interconnectedness with banks, liquidity 
pressure is felt by the money market mutual funds 
(MMMFs) whenever redemption requirements of 
banks are large and simultaneous. Regulatory 
measures  taken to  reduce  the  degree  of 
interconnectedness seem to have been successful in 
reducing the liquidity risk in the system.
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Financial Benchmarks
Although there have been no major instances of 
manipulation of market rates in India’s domestic 
markets, the Reserve Bank has constituted a 
committee to conduct a review of the systems and 
procedures in place with regard to major fi nancial 
benchmarks.
Some Issues in Indian Financial Markets
Action to create central repositories for the banking 
sector, corporate bond market and insurance sector 
has been initiated. This move is expected to break the 
information asymmetry in those markets.
India’s domestic markets for derivatives have not 
taken off due to the absence of some of the basic 
building blocks. Efforts are on to address these issues. 
It has also been observed that the equity prices of the 
companies in which the promoters had pledged 
signifi cant portions of their shares, are relatively more 
volatile than the broader market during times of 
correction.
Payment and Settlement Systems
The payment and settlement system infrastructure 
in the country continued to perform without any 
major disruptions.
Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC) 
and its Sub Committee
The Financial Stability and Development Council 
(FSDC) and its Sub Committee deliberated on various 
aspects that impinge on financial stability - 
macroeconomic scenario, both global and domestic 
and the developments in fi nancial markets.
 Chapter I Macro-Financial Risks
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Chapter I
Macro-Financial Risks
The US Federal Reserve (Fed) announced tapering in its bond purchase programme on December 18, 2013. 
Financial markets had been expecting this move since the first indication of such action in May 2013. Initial 
reaction to the tapering announcement has been positive. 
Growth differential between advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) 
has been narrowing, while the inflation differential has been widening. The resultant risk-return dynamics seem 
to favour AEs, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the EMDEs.
India utilised the delay in tapering to bring about adjustment in the current account deficit (CAD) and built 
buffers by replenishing its foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, external sector risks have been considerably 
reduced and the effect of the tapering on the economy is expected to be limited and short lived. However, macro-
economic adjustment is far from complete, with persistence of high inflation amidst growth slowdown. Fall in domestic 
savings rate and high fiscal deficit continue to pose challenges for India. 
The Indian economy staged a small recovery in the second quarter of the current fiscal year with growth at 4.8 per 
cent, an improvement over the previous quarter’s 4.4 per cent with improvement in growth spread across sectors. 
On the external front, the CAD moderated sharply to 1.2 per cent of GDP during Q2 2013-14 due to a decline 
in the trade deficit.
Boom period expansions that led to excess capacities and structural impediments continue to weigh on corporate 
performance. Asset composition of corporate balance-sheets shows a shift towards increased financial investments.
Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) continue to remain significant players in the domestic equity markets, despite 
some fall in their ownership of index stocks after June 2013. As such, entities with equity market exposure need to 
brace for any future volatilities which might result from perceived changes in relative returns across markets. 
Global Backdrop
1.1  The previous Financial Stability Report (FSR) 
was published against the backdrop of uncertainty 
and volatility unleashed by the US Federal Reserves’ 
(Fed) intent of tapering its  bond purchases 
programme, first indicated in May 2013 and 
reaffirmed in June 2013. Emerging  market and 
developing economies (EMDEs) witnessed huge 
outfl ows from their debt and equity  markets and 
large depreciation of their currencies following the 
May 2013 announcement. Apart  from policy 
measures to address adverse current account 
balances, various capital control  measures had to be 
resorted to by affected economies to stem the sharp 
fall of their currencies.  A semblance of stability 
returned to fi nancial markets when fears of tapering 
receded in  September 2013. While the May – June 
events offered a preview of what would follow a 
change  in ultra-easy monetary policies in advanced 
economies (AEs), the respite offered time to policy 
makers to improve the resilience of their economies 
to face the effects of tapering, eventually  with less 
deleterious impact.
1.2  This FSR is being fi nalised at a time when the 
Fed has laid to rest the uncertainty on timing of the 
exit. This time around, fi nancial markets seem to 
have factored-in the tapering  and have reacted 
generally positively to the announcement. The Fed’s 
for ward  gu idance  of  mainta in ing  h igh ly 
accommodative stance of monetary policy for a 
considerable period of time  after the asset purchase 
program ends and further strengthening of US 
economic recovery  also provided more clarity on the 
movement of policy interest rates. With the Fed 
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announcing  a tapering of USD 10 billion, beginning 
in January 2014, in its monthly USD 85 billion bond 
purchase programme, volatility in fi nancial markets 
henceforth will be conditioned by changes in the pace 
of tapering.
1.3  In the meanwhile, Euro Area has made progress 
in moving towards a banking union. Declining 
infl ation and tepid growth in the region necessitated 
reduction in policy rates. There have been concerns 
that Germany’s persistent and large current account 
surplus might be hampering ‘rebalancing’ in the Euro 
Area. Economic policies in Japan seem to have 
improved sentiments and boosted growth. Growth 
in China during Q3 2013 has been better than 
expectations.
Growth-Infl ation Dynamics - Challenges for EMDEs
1.4  Realignment of global growth is likely to result 
in volatile cross-border fl ows, thus posing threats to 
fi nancial stability especially in EMDEs. With the 
growth differential between AEs and EMDEs 
narrowing (Chart 1.1), large gyrations in fi nancial 
markets are likely with every re-pricing of risk. 
Relatively slower growth in EMDEs may tilt the risk-
return structure in favour of AEs which could lead 
to capital outfl ows from EMDEs when global liquidity 
falls. Going forward, potential debt ceiling 
brinksmanship in the US in early 2014 could re-enact 
the events witnessed earlier. 
1.5  Most AEs are faced with low and falling 
infl ation and are constrained to keep interest rates 
low or near zero for an extended period. Some EMDEs 
like Argentina, India and Indonesia among others are 
experiencing high infl ation (Chart 1.2). The resultant 
infl ation differential between some of the EMDEs 
and AEs is a potential source of volatility in exchange 
rates as capital fl ows could change direction abruptly. 
In this context, it is imperative for India to contain 
infl ation and strengthen the economy before further 
reversal of easy money policies in the AEs materialises. 
Infl ation management remains a major challenge for 
Chart 1.1: GDP Growth
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 1.2: CPI Infl ation
Source: Bloomberg
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India in an environment of sluggish growth and 
significant differential between the food price 
infl ation and manufacturing prices infl ation.
1.6  With unemployment rate falling in the US, 
phased withdrawal from the Fed’s bond purchase 
programme has materialised. However, the fall in 
unemployment rate has come on the back of a fall in 
the labour force participation rate as well as near 
stagnant employment-population ratio at a low level 
(Chart 1.3). In addition, even with large monetary 
policy accommodation, infl ation as measured by the 
annual change in price index for personal consumption 
expenditures in the US is below the Fed’s target of 2 
per cent and could pose challenges for growth going 
forward. The Euro Area has similar concerns with 
negative GDP growth (Y-o-Y) during Q3 2013 and 
infl ation much below the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB) target, prompting a policy rate cut.
1.7  Easy money policies in AEs, however, have 
been pushing up asset prices with little perceptible 
effect on consumer prices (Chart 1.4). Search for yield 
continues unabated after having moderated briefl y 
during mid-2013 (Chart 1.5). Paradoxical as it may 
seem, the response to global fi nancial crisis (GFC) 
which was, to a large extent, perpetuated by an 
extended period of low interest rates and excess 
liquidity, has once again been extended periods low 
interest rates and easy liquidity. While initial 
unconventional policies contributed to improved 
market functioning, keeping interest rates low to 
artifi cially pump prime markets could accentuate the 
vulnerabilities already built in. Some of the 
vulnerabilities played out after the announcement 
of tapering of quantitative easing (QE) by the Fed in 
May 2013.
Chart 1.4: Y-o-Y Asset Price Change and Infl ation: US
Note: Home Price Index refers to the S&P Case-ShillerComposite-20 Home Price 
Index
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 1.5: Non-Investment Grade Corporate Debt: US
Note: Data updated up to November 30, 2013
Source: Bloomberg
Chart 1.3: US Unemployment Statistics
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics, United States Department of Labour
7Financial Stability Report December 2013  
Domestic Economy 
Macro Economic Risks
1.8  Against this backdrop, macro-economic risks 
facing the Indian economy increased (Chart 1.6) 
between March 2013 and September 2013 though 
some risks have fallen since then.
1.9  Real GDP growth in India moderated to 5.0 per 
cent during 2012-13 from 6.2 per cent in 2011-12, and 
slackened further to 4.4 per cent during Q1 2013-14 
before improving marginally to 4.8 per cent during 
Q2 2013-14. Sub sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing, electricity, construction and fi nancing 
and business services witnessed an improvement in 
performance during Q2 vis-a-vis the corresponding 
period of the previous year, in contrast to the broad-
based deceleration in the previous quarter. On the 
whole, GDP growth rate in the fi rst half of 2013-14 
(H1) was placed at 4.6 per cent as compared to 5.3 per 
cent in H1 2012-13. Supply constraints and high 
infl ation, however, continued to weigh on the growth 
process. Aggregate demand during Q2 2013-14 picked-
up primarily on account of exports and, to some 
extent, fixed investment. While private final 
consumption expenditure (PFCE) decelerated during 
Q2, government final consumption expenditure 
(GFCE) declined by 1.1 per cent as compared with a 
strong growth of over 10 per cent in the previous 
quarter.
1.10  A modest improvement in growth is envisaged 
in the second half of 2013-14, on the back of a good 
monsoon which has boosted the kharif prospects. 
Exports have picked up with exchange rate adjustment, 
and global growth is expected to improve from 2.9 
per cent in 2013 to 3.6 per cent in 20141. On the policy 
front, the government has initiated action in clearing 
projects especially in the infrastructure sector, which 
is expected to improve the overall investment climate. 
These measures would, however, take time to 
translate into activity at the ground-level. The revival 
1  WEO-October 2013, IMF
Chart 1.6: Macroeconomic Risk Map
Note: Latest data for External dimension pertain to June 2013. Movement away 
from the centre depicts increasing risks. Refer to Annex-2 for Methodology.
Source: RBI Staff Calculation
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of large stalled projects cleared by the Cabinet 
Committee on Investment are likely to buoy 
investment and overall activity towards the end of 
fi scal year. The downside risks to the domestic growth 
stem from persistently high infl ation (Chart 1.7), 
relatively high fi scal defi cit and consequent pressure 
on interest rates and uncertainty in the global 
environment.
1.11  The disinfl ationary effect of growth slowdown 
has not been witnessed as the pass-through of rupee 
depreciation into prices of manufactured products 
has been taking place, while food and fuel infl ation 
have been elevated in the absence of supply side 
response and high wage infl ation. Wholesale price 
index (WPI) infl ation remained around/above 7 per 
cent for the fourth consecutive month in November 
2013. Retail infl ation measured by the consumer price 
index (CPI) also rose sharply and crossed the 11 per 
cent mark in November 2013. Even as some 
moderation is expected in food inflation going 
forward, persistence of retail infl ation remains a 
concern. To address the infl ationary concerns and to 
strengthen the environment for sustainable growth 
by fostering macroeconomic and fi nancial stability, 
monetary policy was tightened in September 2013 
and October 2013 by a cumulative 50 basis points hike 
in repo rate.
Infl ation and Household Financial Savings
1.12  In addition to the uncertainty which persistently 
high infl ation brings to the business environment, it 
also adversely affects purchasing power, consumption 
and inflation adjusted returns on assets. This is 
particularly true of infl ation adjusted returns on bank 
deposits (Chart 1.8).
1.13  One possible consequence of this has been a 
fall in net financial assets of households as a 
percentage of GDP. Money saved in bank deposits as 
a percentage of GDP by households has also fallen 
from the highs of the mid-2000s (Chart 1.9). On the 
other hand, non-fi nancial assets seemed to have 
Chart 1.8: Bank Deposit Rate and Infl ation
Note: Data on bank deposit rates pertain to the average of minimum and maximum 
interest rates on 1 -3 years maturity deposits for Public Sector Banks. Data are 
monthly averages
Source: RBI
Chart 1.9: Household Savings
Source: RBI
Chart 1.7: Infl ation in India
Source: Calculated using GoI Data
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enabled households to earn relatively better infl ation 
adjusted returns. Further, differential tax treatment 
of bank deposits, capital market instruments and 
non-fi nancial assets like real-estate also creates a bias 
against bank deposits, which account for a signifi cant 
proportion of household fi nancial assets. A fall in 
savings has widened the saving-investment (S-I) gap 
increasing the economy’s dependence on external 
capital. Recent measures such as the re-introduction 
of infl ation indexed bonds (IIBs) and introduction of 
CPI linked saving certifi cates for retail customers are 
part of the strategy to encourage investors to invest 
in fi nancial assets. Further Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) recently brought out the draft 
Delay in tapering by the Fed following its initial 
announcement in May 2013, offered time for India and 
other EMDEs to undertake measures to improve the 
resilience of their economies to withstand the effects of 
inevitable tapering. India took a series of co-ordinated 
measures which seem to have worked well. Some of these 
are outlined below:
Measures to Augment Flows:
(i)  Exemption of incremental FCNR(B)/NRE deposits with 
a maturity of three years and above from CRR/SLR 
requirements,
(ii) Exclusion of the incremental FCNR(B)/NRE deposits 
from adjusted net bank credit for computation of 
priority sector lending targets,
(iii) Liberalisation of FDI norms through review of limits 
and (or) shifting of selected sectors to the automatic 
route for FDI,
(iv)  offering a window to banks to swap the fresh FCNR(B) 
dollar funds with the Reserve Bank (up to November 
30, 2013),
(v)  Increase in the overseas borrowing limit of banks 
from 50 to 100 per cent of the unimpaired Tier I 
capital (with the option of swap with the Reserve 
Bank),
(vi) Permission given to eligible borrowers to avail 
external commercial borrowings (ECB) under the 
approval route from their foreign equity holder 
company for general corporate purposes,
Measures to address pressure on the Exchange Rate
(i) Foreign exchange swap for public oil marketing 
companies (OMCs),
(ii) Expansion of bi-lateral currency swap arrangement 
with Japan.
Other Measures:
(i) Measures to rationalise gold imports
(ii) Increase in import duty on gold
 A sum of USD 34 billion has been received under 
both the schemes (swap facility for FCNR (B) deposits and 
bank overseas borrowings) till closure of the scheme at 
end November 2013. Introduction of the foreign exchange 
swap for public OMCs contributed to the stability of the 
exchange rate. With volatility diminishing in the foreign 
exchange market, OMCs have been meeting all their daily 
dollar requirements through the market from the last 
week of November 2013. However, as indicated in the 
previous FSR, the need for augmenting long term capital 
infl ows, particularly equity fl ows, remains important.
Box 1.1: External Sector Stabilisation Measures
consultation paper on Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs).
External Sector Vulnerabilities
1.14  Against the backdrop of a large CAD and 
dependence on volatile capital fl ows to fund it, the 
Indian rupee had depreciated following the Fed’s May 
2013 indication of possible tapering in its bond 
purchase programme. There have been signifi cant 
improvements on the external front since then, 
following measures initiated by the Government of 
India (GoI) and the Reserve Bank (Box 1.1). The 
current account defi cit (CAD) during Q2 2013-14 fell 
sharply to 1.2 per cent of GDP from 4.9 per cent 
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during Q1 2013-14 due to decline in the trade defi cit. 
From July 2013 onwards exports have grown faster 
than imports. The CAD is expected to be less than 3 
per cent of GDP during the current fi nancial year. 
The increased resilience of the Indian financial 
markets is evidenced by the positive reaction to the 
announcement of the commencement of tapering 
from January 2014 by the Fed.
1.15  In recent years, there has been a signifi cant rise 
in outfl ows of investment income in the current 
account (Chart 1.10). Such outfl ows include interest 
payments on commercial borrowings, Non-resident 
Indian (NRI) deposits and FII investment in debt 
securities as also outfl ows on account of FDI. Reliance 
on external debt for fi nancing high CAD, deregulation 
of interest rate on NRI deposits and liberalisation of 
ECB norms have inter alia contributed to the rise in 
interest payment during this period. While attracting 
capital infl ows to tide over the CAD appears attractive, 
the long term solution to India’s external problems 
lies in increasing productivity and export 
competitiveness.
1.16  Boosting exports in an environment of low 
global growth could be challenging. However, the 
strategy of geographical diversifi cation of India’s 
trade towards Asian economies has been fruitful on 
this front (Chart 1.11). The focus on rationalising 
imports, by curtailing non-essential imports, has 
helped check the growth in CAD. On the positive 
side, the emerging geopolitics and increased 
availability of alternative energy sources such as shale 
gas can possibly have positive impact on the energy 
import bill.
1.17  The enhanced currency swap arrangement with 
Japan for USD 50 billion provides an additional buffer 
to cushion any impact on the Indian rupee. The ratio 
of short term debt (original maturity) to total debt 
increased marginally (Table 1.1), but a large part of it 
being trade related credit is usually rolled over. 
Chart 1.10: Outfl ows on account of inward investments
Source: RBI
Chart 1.11: Direction of India’s Trade
Source: RBI
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Chart 1.12: Daily Variation in the USD/INR Exchange Rate
Note: Positive values indicate appreciation of the INR and negative values depict depreciation
Source: Calculated using Bloomberg data
Further, bilateral trade with countries witnessing 
increasing trade surplus with India may also reduce 
the demand for dollars. Fall in gold imports during 
Q2 2013-14 augurs well for the current account 
balance. If gold is excluded from the import basket, 
it improves the import coverage ratio of reserves. On 
balance, India’s external position appears to be 
manageable and reserves seem adequate.
1.18  Despite a record CAD and high average 
infl ation (WPI and CPI) the rupee appreciated by 
about 2 per cent between Q2 2012-13 and Q3 
2012-13 (average exchange rate during the quarter 
over average exchange rate during the previous 
quarter). Dynamics such as these could have 
influenced exchange rate movements after May 
2013. In general, the Indian rupee has become more 
volatile after the global fi nancial crises (Chart 1.12). 
Table 1.1: External Sector Indicators
(Ratios in per cent)
Indicator End-
Mar 
2012
End-
Mar 
2013
End-
Jun 
2013
1 2 3 4
1. Ratio of Total Debt to GDP 19.7 21.3 22.7
2. Ratio of Total Debt to GDP (ex NRI Deposits) 16.4 17.4 18.6
3. Ratio of Short-term to Total Debt (Original Maturity) 22.6 24.7 24.9
4. Ratio of Trade Related Credit to Short Term Debt 
(Original Maturity)
83.3 89.8 92.2
5. Ratio of Short Term Credit (ex Trade Related 
Credit) to Total Debt (Original Maturity)
3.8 2.5 1.9
6. Ratio of Short-term to Total Debt (Residual 
Maturity)#
42.7 44.2 43.8
7. Ratio of Short-term Debt to Reserves (Original 
Maturity)
26.6 33.1 34.3
8. Ratio of Short Term Debt (ex Trade Related 
Credit) to Reserves (Original Maturity)
4.4 3.4 2.7
9. Ratio of Short-term Debt to Reserves (Residual 
Maturity)#
50.1 59.0 60.2
10. Reserves Cover of Imports (in months) 7.1 7.0 6.7
11. Reserves Cover of Imports (in months) (ex Gold) 8.0 7.8 7.6
12. External Debt (US$ billion) 345.8 392.1 388.5
#: RBI Estimate.
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The INR has been, historically, relatively less volatile 
compared to some other emerging EMDE currencies 
(Chart 1.13). In general, there has been an increase 
in the offshore2 turnover of emerging market 
currencies during the last few years. For instance 
according to the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) in the case of some emerging market currencies 
more than half of average daily turnover, during 
April 2013, emanated in the offshore market 
(Chart 1.14). 
Fiscal Correction – Challenges
1.19  Key defi cit indicators of the central government 
have widened signifi cantly during the fi rst seven 
months of 2013-14 in comparison to the corresponding 
period of the previous year (Chart 1.15). Higher plan 
spending and lower revenue mobilisation resulted in 
higher gross fi scal defi cit (GFD) which was more than 
84 per cent of the budget estimate during the fi rst 
seven months of the current fi scal year.
1.20  The Government, in its Medium Term Fiscal 
Policy Statement, has stated that plan expenditure 
has to remain within affordable levels, at least till the 
process of fi scal consolidation is over. Hence, if the 
government has to meet its GFD target of 4.8 per cent 
of GDP, shortfall in receipts and the slippage in major 
subsidies could lead to a sharp cut back in the plan 
expenditure, thereby affecting the quality of fi scal 
adjustment in the near term.
1.21  Revisiting and adherence to the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBMA) 
may boost credibility of the government and improve 
confi dence in the economy. Even from a fi nancial 
market development perspective, lower government 
borrowing can go a long way in addressing many 
structural constraints inhibiting fi nancial market 
development. To compensate for the reduced 
capacity of the State in fi nancing desirable capital 
Chart 1.14: Share of Offshore turnover in total Turnover
Note: Adjusted for local and cross-border inter-dealer double-counting  (i.e. “net-net” 
basis)
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, December 2013
Source: Controller General of Accounts, Ministry of Finance, GoI
Chart 1.15: Budgetary Position of the GOI: April-October
Chart 1.13: EMDE Currency Volatility
Note: Volatility refers to 250 day rolling standard deviation of daily variation in 
exchange rate against the USD. Data updated up to December 18, 2013
Source: Calculated using Bloomberg data
2  Offshore trades refers to all trades executed outside the jurisdiction where a currency is issued
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expenditure, private sector needs to be incentivised 
to fill the gap mainly through financial market 
development.
1.22  The average life to maturity of the outstanding 
GoI’s dated securities at 9.67 years is quite elongated 
and thus, does not pose any signifi cant rollover risk. 
Nonetheless, redemption pressure would increase 
significantly starting from 2014-15 to 2019-20 
(Chart 1.16). The demand for long-dated government 
securities dwindled in the aftermath of the global 
fi nancial crisis. Thus, a large portion of the government 
market borrowing programme during 2008-09 and 
2009-10 was completed by issuing relatively short 
and medium-term securities which are maturing 
between 2014-15 and 2018-19.
1.23  The concern of elevated redemption, however, 
could be addressed by using buyback/ switches of 
G-Secs as part of the debt management strategy. 
These strategies are used extensively for liability 
management operations across advanced and several 
emerging market economies (EMEs). The Union 
Budget 2013-14 has provided ` 500 billion for buyback 
and switches and such operations are likely to be 
undertaken in the last quarter of this fi scal year. This 
will involve swapping short-term securities with 
long-term securities in order to reduce the redemption 
pressure for the maturity buckets from 2014-15 to 
2018-19.
Corporate Sector
1.24  Indian corporate sector witnessed relatively 
subdued performance during Q2 2013-14 as 
evidenced by continuing contraction in net profi ts 
and decline in net profi t margin (Chart 1.17). Net 
profi ts contracted for the second succesive quarter 
of the current fi scal year even though sales growth 
increased. Profi t margins of the listed non-government 
non-fi nancial (NGNF) companies remained low since 
Q2FY12. Profit margin [EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) to sales] 
improved marginally in Q1 2013-14 in comparison 
Note: Position as on December 9, 2013.
Source: RBI
Chart 1.16: GoI Debt: Redemptions
Note: Data pertain to listed Non-Government Non-Financial Companies. Sample of 
2708 companies during Q2 2013-14.
Source: RBI
Chart 1.17: Performance of the Corporate Sector
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with the previous quarter but worsened during Q2 
2013-14. Interest coverage ratio, measured by the 
ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest, tax) to interest 
payment, recorded a marginal improvement in 
Q2 2013-14. 
1.25  The Corporate Sector Stability Indicator and 
Map3 presents an overall assessment of changes in 
underlying conditions and risk factors affecting the 
stability of the corporate sector. The assessment is 
based on fi ve dimensions, viz. leverage, liquidity, 
profitability, sustainability and turnover, during 
1992-93 – 2012-13. Results suggest that between 
1992-93 and 1995-96 stability of the corporate sector 
increased (Chart 1.18). Stability deteriorated due to 
stress in all five dimensions during 1995-96 to 
1996-97. The corporate sector remained relatively 
stressed till 2001-02. Stability improved considerably 
during 2001-02 - 2007-08. Leverage increased towards 
the end of this period. Deterioration in all dimensions 
was witnessed during 2007-08 - 2008-09 with 
profi tability and leverage contributing signifi cantly to 
overall stress. After marginal improvement in 2009-10, 
stress increased again. Demand and effi ciency factors 
contributed more towards increase in risks. 
Sustainability, leverage and profitability also 
contributed to stress. Though there is some 
improvement in profi tability4 towards the second half 
of 2012-13, other stability parameters deteriorated 
further (Chart 1.19).
1.26  The performance of private corporate sector 
during the last few years has been a concern especially 
amid falling economic growth. Fall in investments 
Note: Increase in indicator value shows lower stability. The area for each dimension 
signifi es its contribution towards risk
Source: Corporate Balance Sheets and RBI staff calculations
Chart 1.18: Corporate Sector Stability Indicator
Note: Away from the centre shows increase in risk
Source: Corporate Balance Sheets and RBI staff calculations
Chart 1.19: Corporate Sector Stability Map
3  The fi ve composite indices represent the fi ve dimensions of leverage, liquidity, profi tability, sustainability and turnover. Each index, representing an 
aspect of corporate functioning, takes a value between zero (minimum) and 1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period 
used for its construction, where a high value implies high risk in that dimension. Therefore, an increase in the value of the index in any particular 
dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared to other periods.
A number of ratio-variables are used for each dimension. Each ratio-variable is standardised for the sample period by fi rst converting into a standard 
normal-variate and then using relative distance method. A composite measure of each dimension is calculated as a simple average of standardised 
ratios used for that dimension. The overall corporate sector stability indicator is derived as a weighted average of indices of chosen fi ve dimensions, 
where the weights are derived using principal component analysis. Annual corporate balance sheet data for about 3000 companies have been used. See 
Annex-2 for detailed methodology. 
4  Half-yearly balance sheet data of large corporates have been used for 2011-12:H1, 2012-13:H1, 2012-13:H2 and 2013-14:H1.
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(ratio of gross capital formation to GDP) from 38 per 
cent in 2007-08 to 35 per cent in 2011-12 is one of the 
important factors behind slowing growth in the 
industrial sector. While the global slowdown played 
an important role, growth in the Indian private sector 
investments (gross capital formation) had started 
falling during the years preceding the onset of global 
fi nancial crisis (Chart 1.20).
1.27  Asset composition of corporates underwent a 
change during the last two decades. An analysis based 
on the data5 for a sample of common companies for 
the period 1999-91 to 2011-12, brings out a clear shift 
towards increasing share of fi nancial investments in 
total assets, even as the incremental investment in 
fi xed capital assets like plant and machinery has been 
slowing6. The contribution of gross fi xed assets to the 
total assets which stood at 74.2 per cent during 2002-
03 gradually declined to 52.6 per cent during 2011-12. 
During this period, financial investment of the 
corporates increased to 19.8 per cent of total assets 
during 2011-12 from 12.4 per cent in 2002-03 
(Chart 1.21). This rise in the share of investment to 
total assets was mainly due to the increasing 
contribution of investments in the ‘shares and 
debentures of subsidiaries’ and ‘securities of fi nancial 
institutions’. The ‘cash and bank balances’ of 
corporates, which include the ‘fi xed deposits with 
banks’, have also risen during the period under 
analysis.
Equity and Debt Markets
1.28  Subsequent to the Fed’s mid-June 2013 tapering 
announcement, foreign institutional investors (FIIs) 
withdrew from the Indian equity and bond markets, 
but returned as net buyers to the equity market in 
September 2013, though they were net sellers in the 
bond market till November 2013 (Chart 1.22). While 
the actions of domestic and foreign institutions are 
Source: RBI
Source: RBI
Chart 1.20: Annual Growth in Gross Capital Formation in 
Private Corporate Sector7
Chart 1.21: Trends in Asset Composition of Corporate Sector 
(Per cent of Total Assets)
5  This analysis is based on common sample of 765 Non-Government Non-Financial Public Limited Companies
6  Also see Chandak, B.L (2013), “Present Economic Crisis Due to Overplaying of Corporate Sector Investment?”, The Indian Banker, October
7  GCF Figures at Current market Prices with 2004-05 as base year. GDP fi gures at factor cost at constant market prices
Note: Data updated up to December 17, 2013
Source: SEBI
Chart 1.22: FII Net Investment in the Equity and Bond Market
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counterbalancing, the dominance of foreign 
institutions prevails (Chart 1.23). Between September 
2007 and September 2013, FII ownership of the BSE 
Sensex and the NSE Nifty ranged between 14 per cent 
– 30 per cent showing a downward trend in the wake 
of the fi nancial crisis (Chart 1.24). FII holding of index 
stocks began increasing from March 2009 possibly on 
the back of easy monetary policy in the AEs, among 
other factors. However, FII holdings fell after June 
2013 on concerns about tapering in QE. The reaction 
of the Indian equity markets to the recent 
announcement of tapering of QE has been largely 
positive suggesting that markets had factored-in the 
tapering.
1.29  Holding of Indian bonds (government bonds 
and corporate bonds) by FIIs have fallen from around 
`1,901 billion as at end March 2013 to around ` 1,261 
billion as on December18, 20138. Thus, risk from large 
outfl ows from the bond market have are relatively 
low. With increased volatility in domestic fi nancial 
markets after May 2013, the upfront margin 
prescribed as part of the risk management framework, 
in the equity cash and derivatives market and 
currency derivatives segment, was adequate to cover 
the price movements/volatility on each of the days 
during April-September 2013 i.e. there was no 
violation of margin calls.
1.30  Consequent to policy measures initiated by the 
Reserve Bank to address volatility in the foreign 
exchange market, the overnight money market rates 
increased temporarily in line with policy intent and 
were largely anchored around the Marginal Standing 
Facility (MSF). Reacting to the tightening measures, 
yield on short term government securities hardened 
considerably, which got transmitted across the term 
structure for a short duration and also increased 
volatility. Pressures on yields also arose as domestic 
infl ation fi rmed up and the market priced-in increased 
probability of global interest rate hardening. 
Note: Data are provisional and updated up to December 17, 2013
Source: SEBI and BSE
Chart 1.23: FIIs and DIIs in the Indian Equity Market
Source: SEBI
Chart 1.24: FII Ownership of Index Stocks
8  SEBI and NSDL
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Hardening yields resulted in decline in net asset value 
(NAV) of debt schemes, resulting in substantial 
redemption pressure for the mutual funds. Banks’ 
investments as a percentage of total assets under 
management (AUM) of liquid/money market scheme 
also declined signifi cantly during the period July 15 
- July 31, 2013. As stability returned to the foreign 
exchange market, the Reserve Bank normalised the 
exceptional liquidity and monetary measures in a 
calibrated manner and completed this process by 
October 2013. Ceteris paribus, this action had a 
softening impact on bond yields.
1.31  Notwithstanding steep increase in G-Sec yields 
after policy measures announced in July 2013, the 
weighted average cost of GoI’s borrowing through 
nominal dated securities during 2013-14 (up to 
December 6) remained marginally lower than that 
during 2012-13 as yields had moderated signifi cantly 
in the fi rst quarter of 2013-14. With reduction in the 
MSF rates from September 20, 2013 onwards G-Sec 
yields started moderating from their elevated levels 
and volatility also started declining. In addition, 
systemic liquidity as measured by the systemic 
liquidity indicator (SLI), began improving from early 
September 2013 and was comfortable from early 
October 2013 onwards (Chart 1.25).
House Prices
1.32  House prices in some major Indian cities have 
registered extremely high growth between 2007 and 
Q2 2013 with some cities registering a doubling of 
prices during this relatively short time period 
(Chart 1.26). However, during Q2 2013, house prices 
in some cities fell while in other cities the growth in 
house prices moderated. About two-fi fth of credit 
available for retail housing is accounted for by housing 
fi nance companies (HFCs). Outstanding loans for 
housing by HFCs have grown relatively faster than 
outstanding retail housing loans by scheduled 
Note: The SLI below zero denotes comfortable level of liquidity conditions in the 
system, whereas level above zero implies tight liquidity conditions. Updated up to 
December 13, 2013
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 1.25: Systemic Liquidity Indicator
Source: Calculated using NHB Data
Chart 1.26: Change in House Price
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commercial banks (SCBs) and have doubled in four 
years from 2007 (Chart 1.27).
Informal Sector and Wealth Effects
1.34  The increasing relevance of the informal sector 
and wealth effects of increasing asset prices in the 
Indian economy, which have grown in signifi cance 
especially after the initial set of financial sector 
reforms in the 1990s, can hardly be over-emphasised. 
However, information on these aspects is scarce. It is 
imperative to construct robust datasets pertaining to 
the informal sector from a policy making and 
developmental planning perspective, while data on 
wealth effects will be useful mainly to assess the 
impact on consumption patterns. The Report of the 
Committee on Unorganised Sector Statistics 2012 
recognised that it was important to include and build 
comprehensive database on various aspects of the 
informal economy as part of the national statistical 
system. To achieve this end, several recommendations 
have been made to improve information on informal 
sector employment and enterprises among other 
aspects. Effect of changes in employment and income 
in the informal sector on consumption and GDP can 
be tracked and better policy responses can be devised 
if robust information about this sector is present.
Pension System
1.35  India’s pension system for the informal sector 
is equipped inadequately to handle the rapid ageing, 
which will pan out in the next few decades. The share 
of elderly in the population has increased from 5.6 
per cent in 1961 to 7.4 per cent in 2001 and is 
projected to rise to 12.4 per cent by 20269 (Chart 1.28). 
The absolute numbers will double from 77 million in 
2001 to 143 million by 202110. With rising life 
expectancy and declining fertility, the demographic 
window of opportunity will close soon and the small 
cohort of children born during this time will fi nd 
Source: Calculated using NHB and RBI Supervisory Returns data
Chart 1.27:  Growth in Finance to the Housing Sector
(Base = March 2007)
9   Situation Analysis Of The Elderly in India, Central Statistics Offi ce, Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation, Government of India, June 2011
10  Situation Analysis Of The Elderly in India, Central Statistics Offi ce, Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation, Government of India, June 2011.
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, Population Estimates and Projection Section
Chart 1.28: Demographic Projections for India
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themselves supporting a large cohort of elderly 
parents. Besides, this demographic transition occurred 
in the developed world at higher income levels, while 
the challenge for India in addressing the coverage gap 
is compounded by fiscal constraints and the un-
affordability of an adequate level of public expenditure 
for pensions.
1.36  India’s high growth rates in the past two 
decades have been accompanied by the disturbing 
trend of increasing informalisation. The informal/
unorganised sector constitutes more than 90 per cent 
of the workforce and accounts for 50 per cent of the 
GDP. Tenuous labour market attachment, intermittent 
incomes, poor access to social security renders the 
unorganized workers highly vulnerable to economic 
shocks during their productive years. Coupled with 
Even today the pension budgets, which contain 
signifi cant expenditure for the old, for states like Bihar, 
Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal account for more 
than 25 per cent of their revenues. The situation in the 
North Eastern states is worse with pension budgets 
accounting for over 50 per cent of revenues in four states 
of which Nagaland’s expenditure on pensions is more 
than 135 per cent of its own revenues.  The present 
central and state government budget on pensions 
exceeds ` 1,600 billion (BE for 2012-13). It is worth noting 
that these budgets pertain to the retirees amongst the 
civil servants who constitute a small percentage of the 
population. Considering the current budget estimations 
and commitment towards the pension obligations, a 
continuous launch of numerous Defi ned Benefi t (DB) 
schemes with lack of liability computation may prove 
to be fi scally challenging in an era of increasing life 
expectancy.
The GoI approved on 23rd August 2003 the proposal to 
implement the budget announcement of 2003-04 relating 
to introducing a new restructured defi ned contribution 
pension system for new entrants to Central Government 
service, except to Armed Forces, in the fi rst stage, 
replacing the existing system of defi ned benefi t pension 
system. The new system was also to be available, on a 
voluntary basis, to all persons including self employed 
professionals and others in the unorganised sector. The 
National Pension System (NPS) was, therefore, created to 
serve both the Government employees and the private 
sector workers. While the absence of a country-wide 
social security system (formal pension coverage being 
about 12 per cent of the working population), the ageing 
and social change were important considerations for 
introducing pension reform in the unorganised sector, 
fi scal stress of the defi ned benefi t pension system was 
the major factor driving pension reforms for employees 
in the organised public sector (Government employees). 
This had been designed to make a shift from defi ned-
benefi t to defi ned-contribution, putting a cap on 
government’s liability towards civil servants’ pension, in 
line with the international practices and the realization 
of upcoming fi scal stress of pay-as-you-go system. 
Box 1.2: Planning a Pension System for the Informal Sector
breakdown in traditional family support structures, 
migration, urbanization and no/inadequate retirement 
savings the unorganized workers will inevitably face 
old age poverty and fall back on the tax fi nanced old 
age pensions like National Social Assistance 
Programmes (NSAP). The pension schemes under 
NSAP offer benefi ts that are below subsistence levels 
at ` 200 per month and cater only to the BPL (also see 
Box 1.2). The recently released Mihir Shah Committee 
recommendations on pension schemes under NSAP 
translate to a 12th Plan expenditure exceeding `1,000 
billion a figure which appears to be fiscally 
unsustainable.
1.37  A mono pillar pension system design for 90 per 
cent unorganized sector workers, consisting only of 
defi ned benefi t schemes, as is the case today, will have 
 Chapter I Macro-Financial Risks
20
budgetary allocations spiralling out of control and 
crowd out development expenditure like infrastructure 
investments and welfare expenditure on health and 
education. There is growing unanimity that single 
pillar pension systems (dependent only on tax 
fi nanced pensions) are unable to address the various 
risks associated with population ageing. A system 
design based on multiple pillars which take into 
account the initial conditions and specifi c context of 
the country is better suited to providing protection 
to the elderly. Pursuant to the passing of the Pension 
Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Bill, 
2013 (PFRDA Bill, 2013) by Parliament in September, 
2013, the challenge in further development of the 
pension sector include aggressively covering the 
unorganised sector, which accounts for the substantial 
part of the total labour force and which has no formal 
pension provision, under NPS, and improvement in 
the fi nancial literacy levels to educate the subscribers 
to take appropriate investment decisions based on 
their risk and return profi le so that their pension 
wealth under NPS could be maximised. The PFRDA 
Bill, 2013 seeks to vest PFRDA with statutory status 
in order to help PFRDA perform its regulatory and 
developmental roles effectively. It is expected that 
the success of pension reforms will not only help in 
facilitating the fl ow of long-term savings for economic 
development, but would also help establish a credible 
and fi nancially sustainable social security system in 
the country.
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Chapter II
Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
The Banking Stability Indicator shows that risks to the banking sector have increased since the publication of the 
last FSR in June 2013. Banking Stability Measures, based on co-movements in banks’ equity prices, indicate that 
the distress dependencies within the banking system have started rising. Network analysis has been used to measure 
the impact of contagion in the interconnected banking system to the failure of a major corporate and a major 
corporate group.
The strain on asset quality continues to be a major concern. A few sectors, namely, Infrastructure, Iron & Steel, 
Aviation, Textiles and Mining continue to contribute significantly to the problem assets of the banking sector, while 
the performance of the retail sector has been good. Some factors affecting the asset quality adversely are current 
economic slowdown – global and domestic, persistent policy logjams, delayed clearances of various projects, aggressive 
expansion by corporates during the boom phase with resultant excess capacities, deficiencies in credit appraisal, etc. 
Reserve Bank has recently issued a discussion paper to address the issue of stressed assets.
Macro stress tests indicate that if the adverse macroeconomic conditions persist, the credit quality of commercial 
banks could deteriorate further. However, under improved conditions, the present trend in credit quality may reverse 
during the second half of 2014-15. The present level of provisions of SCBs may not be sufficient to meet the expected 
losses under heightened adverse macroeconomic conditions.
Banking Sector Risks
2.1 The risks to the banking sector, as at end 
September 2013 have increased since the publication 
of the previous FSR1. The Banking Stability Indicator 
1  FSR – June 2013 - with reference to data as at end March 2013.
(BSI), which combines the impact on all major risk 
dimensions, shows an increase in vulnerability in the 
banking sector since September 2010 (Chart 2.1 & 2.2).
Increase in indicator value shows lower stability. The area for each dimension 
signifi es its contribution towards risk.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations.
Chart 2.1: Banking Stability Indicator
Away from the centre signifi es increase in risk.
Chart 2.2: Banking Stability Map
 Chapter II Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
22
Chart 2.4: Distress Between Specifi c Banks
Note: Both the charts contain 15 lines which show the toxicity and vulnerability 
of the selected 15 banks.
Source: Bloomberg Data and RBI Staff Calculations
Distress Dependencies and Interconnectedness
Banking Stability Measures (BSMs)2 – Distress 
Dependency Analysis
Common Distress in the System-Banking Stability 
Index
2.2 The Banking Stability Index (BSI), which 
measures the expected number of banks that could 
become distressed given that at least one bank 
becomes distressed, has risen sharply since August 
2013. The BSI takes into account individual bank’s 
probabilities of distress besides embedding banks’ 
distress dependency. Therefore, the indicator exhibits 
larger and nonlinear increases than the Probabilities 
of Distress (PoDs)3 of individual banks. The BSI 
depicted a rising trend beginning September 2010, 
moderated during the fi rst half of 2013 and again 
reversed the trend in August 2013 indicating 
escalation in common distress in the banking system 
(Chart 2.3).
Distress Relationship Among Banks
2.3 Both the toxicity as well as vulnerability indices 
(TI and VI) have shown a co-movement with that of 
BSI indicating signs of rising toxicity and vulnerability 
of the selected banks. Further, the spread among the 
banks’ VI during its current upward trend is lower 
than the spread observed during the fi nancial crisis, 
indicating that rise in the vulnerability of SCBs has 
become more broad-based. The vulnerability levels 
are however significantly lower than the levels 
observed during the crisis. Further, the spread in the 
banks’ toxicity indices during the current period is 
more divergent than the spread observed during the 
fi nancial crisis, indicating that the degree of the toxic 
behaviour of banks, i.e. the capacity to transmit the 
distress to other banks has diverged (Chart 2.4).
2   Study is based on the equity prices of 15 major banks. These banks represent about 60 per cent of total assets of scheduled commercial banks in 
India. This model for Indian banking system has been developed by Mr. Miguel A. Segoviano, in collaboration with the Reserve Bank. Details are given 
in the Annex-2.
3  The PoDs for banks were estimated from their equity return distributions. Under this approach, fi rst, banks’ historical distributions of equity returns 
are estimated. Then, the probability of returns falling under the historical worse 1 per cent of the cases (99 VaR) is quantifi ed. Therefore, the PoD of a 
specifi c bank represents the probability that the bank’s equity return would fall in the tail region (historical one percentile).
Chart 2.3: Movements of BSI
Source: Bloomberg Data and RBI Staff Calculations.
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Interconnectedness
Contagion Risks in the Indian Banking Sector
2.4 The network tools4 had been used earlier to 
measure the degree of interconnectedness and also 
assess the effects of contagion in case of failure of 
major lending and borrowing banks in the interbank 
system. In this issue of the FSR, network tools are 
being used to assess impact of contagion in a stressed 
scenario. The failure of a major corporate or a major 
corporate group could also trigger a contagion in the 
banking system due to the exposures of a large 
number of banks to the corporate.
Contagion Impact of Credit and Interest Rate Shocks
2.5 The network analysis in previous FSRs 
considered the failure of a bank as a random event 
and measured the contagion impact. The current 
analysis captures contagion effects under different 
conditions – stressed credit and interest rate 
4  The network model used in the analysis has been developed in the Reserve Bank in collaboration with Professor Sheri Markose (University of Essex) 
and Dr. Simone Giansante (Bath University). Details are given in the Annex-2.
5  For the purpose of this analysis, a bank is considered to be distressed if its core capital adequacy ratio falls below 6 per cent. It may be noted that this is a 
stringent failure condition considered for the purpose of stress testing the system. The net receivables have been considered as loss for the receiving bank.
6  Details of credit and interest rate risks are discussed under ‘Sensitivity Analysis - Top-Down Stress Tests - Bank Level’ (Paragraph 2.56) .
Table 2.1: Loss to the Banking System under Different Stress Scenarios-September 2013
(Per cent of total capital)
Initial Loss Additional 
Losses Due to 
Contagion
Total Loss
Credit Shocks
NPAs increase by 100 per cent 14.3 26.8 40.1
30 per cent restructured standard advances become NPAs (sub-standard) 2.9 0.0 2.9
30 per cent restructured standard advances are written off 10.7 24.1 34.8
Interest Rate Shocks (Trading Book)
Parallel upward shift of INR yield curve by 250 bps 4.7 0.0 4.7
Steepening of the INR yield curve (0 to 100 bps linear in 0 to 15 years bucket) 0.6 0.0 0.6
Inversion of the INR yield curve# 3.1 0.0 3.1
Interest Rate Shocks (Banking Book)*
Parallel upward shift of INR yield curve by 250 bps 21.0 32.6 53.6
Steepening of the INR yield curve (0 to 100 bps linear in 0 to 15 years bucket) 2.9 1.1 4.0
Inversion of the INR yield curve# 12.9 29.5 42.4
*: Banking Book was assumed to be marked-to-market.
#: Shocks of 250 bps, 100 bps, -50 bps and -100 bps for maturity buckets upto 1 year, 1-3 years, 3-5 years and 5 years & more, respectively.
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
scenarios. These stressed conditions lead to losses in 
capital due to additional provisioning requirements. 
If, in the case of one or more banks, the loss is large 
enough to cause distress to the bank/s5, there will be 
further losses due to the contagion caused by the 
distressed bank / banks. Depending on the importance 
of the distressed bank /banks in the network, the 
contagion losses may be substantial. The total loss to 
the banking system due to the stressed conditions 
will then be the combined impact of (a) the loss caused 
by the stressed conditions6, and (b) the resultant 
contagion losses due to distress in one or more banks 
as a result of the stressed credit or interest rate 
environment.
2.6 The analysis shows that the total loss to the 
banking system after taking into account contagion 
losses could significantly exceed losses due to 
the direct impact of the stressed conditions alone 
(Table 2.1). These risks will need to be taken into 
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cognisance while assessing the impact of credit and 
interest rate shocks on the banking system.
Solvency Contagion in the Interbank Market
2.7 The Indian government holds majority share 
(over 51 per cent) in case of public sector banks (PSBs). 
An analysis of contagion losses arising from the failure 
of major borrower in the system under the assumption 
that PSBs may not be allowed to fail shows that the 
losses are much lower than when PSBs are assumed 
to fail with the same probability as other banks 
(Table 2.2).
Contagion Losses - Credit Concentration
2.8 The performance of the corporate sector in the 
current economic scenario has been a matter of 
concern. The impact of deterioration in the health of 
corporate borrowers on the asset quality of the 
banking system has been discussed elsewhere in this 
report. Here, an attempt has been made to assess how 
default by a large corporate borrower or a corporate 
group triggers contagion risks in the interbank system.
2.9 The failure of a corporate borrower / borrower 
group causes a direct loss to the banking system to 
the extent of the banking system’s exposure to the 
corporate borrower / borrower group. The extent of 
failure varies depending on the degree of the loss 
given default of the corporate borrower / borrower 
group.
2.10 The total loss to the banking system from the 
failure of the corporate / group will typically be 
distributed across banks in proportion to their 
individual exposures to the corporate /group. If, in 
the case of one or more banks, the loss is large enough 
to cause distress to the bank, then there will be further 
losses to the banking system due to the contagion 
caused by the distressed bank / banks. Depending on 
the importance of the distressed bank /banks in the 
network of interbank exposures, the contagion losses 
may be substantial.
2.11 The analysis here attempts to assess the impact 
of direct and contagion losses to the banking system 
Table 2.2: Solvency Contagion Triggered by Top 5 Net
Borrowers in the Interbank Market
Trigger 
Bank
Percentage loss of Tier 
I capital of the bank-
ing system assuming all 
banks have the same 
probability of failure
Percentage loss of Tier 
I capital of the banking 
system assuming that 
PSBs will not fail
A 12.2 6.1
B 9.5 5.2
C 2.7 2.3
D 2.2 2.2
E 2.3 2.3
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
Chart 2.5: Impact of the Failure of a Borrower Group
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
due to the failure of a large corporate group or 
individual corporate borrower. The analysis is based 
on two scenarios – a loss given default (LGD) of 100 
per cent and 60 per cent.
2.12 The above analysis shows that in several cases, 
the contagion losses are signifi cant and could exceed 
the direct losses caused by the failure of the corporate/
group.
2.13 The aforesaid stress scenario indicates that the 
failure of a large corporate group could result in a total 
loss of over 60 per cent of the banking system’s capital 
(when the LGD is 100 per cent) and over 50 per cent 
of the banking system’s capital (when the LGD is 60 
per cent) (Chart 2.5). The loss could be at 14 per cent 
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and 6 per cent in case of the failure of a large corporate 
borrower taking LGD as 100 per cent and 60 per cent, 
respectively (Chart 2.6).
2.14 Such risks posed by a large corporate or 
corporate group are sought to be minimised by large 
exposure limits prescribed by regulators. In the Indian 
context, a bank’s exposure to a single borrower can 
go up to 25 per cent of the bank’s total capital while 
its group exposure limit can go up to 55 per cent of 
its total capital7.
2.15 These exposure norms have evolved in the 
context of the country’s growth and development 
requirements, but are on the higher side by 
international standards. The Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP) of India, conducted 
during 2011-12 by the IMF and World Bank, had 
assessed India to be “materially non-compliant” vis-
à-vis the Basel Core Principle 10 related to “Large 
exposure limits”. The FSAP report commented that 
“the large exposure limit of 40 percent - which can 
exceptionally be brought to 50 percent for 
infrastructure exposures - for a group borrower, is 
signifi cantly higher than the large exposure limits of 
25 percent which is considered good international 
practice ….. this limit has the potential to allow the 
default of one particular consolidated borrower to 
cause a serious loss of capital in a banking company”.
2.16 A recent Basel Committee consultative document 
on “Supervisory Framework for Measuring and 
Controlling Large Exposures - Consultative Document”, 
published in March 2013 has also proposed that the 
threshold defi ning large exposure should be set at 5 
Chart 2.6: Impact of the Failure of a Corporate Borrower
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
7  RBI Master Circular on Large Exposures, July 01, 2013 (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?id=8130)
8   A bank typically has both positive and negative net lending positions against other banks. In the event of failure of such a bank, both solvency and 
liquidity contagion will happen concurrently.  A failing bank essentially becomes insolvent and thus impacts all its creditor banks. At the same time 
it starts to liquidate its assets to meet as much of its obligations as possible. This process of liquidation generates a liquidity contagion as the trigger 
bank starts to call back its loans. The lender/creditor banks which are well capitalised will survive the shock and will generate no further contagion. 
On the other hand, those lender banks whose capital falls below the threshold  core capital ratio of 6 per cent will trigger a fresh contagion. Similarly, 
the borrowers whose liquidity buffers (for the analysis, excess CRR, excess SLR, available MSF and available export credit refi nance are considered as 
liquidity buffers) are suffi cient will be able to tide over the stress without causing further contagion. But some banks may have to call back certain assets 
(for the analysis, only short term money market asset have been assumed to be callable) after exhausting its liquidity buffers to address the liquidity 
stress.  This process of calling in short term assets will again propagate a contagion. The contagion from both the solvency and liquidity side will stop/
stabilise when the loss/shocks are fully absorbed by the system with no further banks coming under duress.
per cent of a bank’s eligible capital base and that the 
large exposure limit may be fi xed at 25 per cent of the 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) or Tier 1 capital (as 
against the currently used total capital).
2.17 In the light of the above analysis, and 
international best practices, a review of the extant 
single and group borrower exposure limits would 
considerably enhance the stability of the banking 
sector.
Joint Solvency-Liquidity Contagion
2.18 The above contagion analyses were based on 
the impact of the failure of a bank on its lenders, i.e. 
the risks arising from a solvency contagion. In the 
event of a failure of a bank, however, both solvency 
(triggered by a net borrower bank) and liquidity 
(triggered by a net lender bank) shocks are likely to 
emanate. An estimate of such risks was made by an 
extension of the network technique to develop a joint 
solvency- liquidity contagion model8. A fl owchart 
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depicting the stylised process of solvency and liquidity 
contagion is presented in Chart 2.7.
2.19 Considering the same trigger banks as earlier, 
the failure of any of the two banks with the largest 
net borrower positions can potentially result in 
enormous loss in banking sector capital due to the 
joint liquidity and solvency contagion (about three 
fourths of Tier 1 capital of the banking sector). 
However, the losses are signifi cantly lower (though 
not insignifi cant) if it is assumed that PSBs will not 
be allowed to fail (Table 2.3).
Scheduled Commercial Banks9
Trends in Credit and Deposit
2.20 Credit growth on y-o-y basis during the period 
ended September 2013 at 17.1 per cent exceeded the 
growth in deposits at 13.8 per cent. As a result there 
has been a signifi cant rise in the incremental C-D ratio 
on y-o-y basis to 91.9 per cent as at end September 
2013 from 79.6 per cent as at end March 2013. Viewed 
in the context of falling household fi nancial savings 
as per cent of GDP, and the reliance on deposits by 
banks as the dominant source of funding, this trend 
is a cause for concern. Bank group wise data on credit 
and deposit trends are given in Chart 2.8.
Table 2.3: Joint Solvency-Liquidity Contagion Triggered by 
Top 5 Net Borrowers
Trigger 
Bank
Percentage loss of Tier 
I capital of the banking 
system assuming all banks 
have the same probability 
of failure
Percentage loss of Tier 
I capital of the banking 
system assuming that PSBs 
will not fail
A 76.5 22.2
B 74.5 23.4
C 24.4 19.1
D 17.2 16.1
E 22.6 17.2
Source: RBI Staff Calculations
9  Analyses of SCBs are based on their domestic operations.
Note: PSBs=Public Sector Banks, NPBs=New Private Banks, OPBs=Old Private Banks and FBs=Foreign Banks
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.7: Flowchart depicting a joint liquidity solvency contagion
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Sector-wise Deployment of Credit
2.21  Year-on-year credit growth to medium and 
small enterprises declined from 25.0 per cent as at 
end March 2013 to 21.1 per cent as at end September 
2013. Export credit continued to contract while credit 
growth to retail housing increased to 18.7 per cent as 
at end September 2013 from 15.5 per cent as at March 
2013 (Chart 2.9).
Soundness
Capital Adequacy
2.22 The Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio 
(CRAR)10 at system level declined to 12.7 per cent as 
at end September 2013 from 13.8 per cent in as at end 
March 2013 (Chart 2.10).
2.23 At bank-group level, PSBs recorded the lowest 
CRAR at 11.2 per cent as at end September 2013 
followed by OPBs at 14.5 per cent. The CRAR of FBs 
and NPBs were 16.3 per cent and 15.9 per cent, 
respectively (Chart 2.10).
2.24 The changing pattern of Risk Weighted Assets 
(RWA) was studied based on the trend in the RWA to 
total assets11 ratio and Coeffi cient of Variation (CV)12 
of the ratio among the banks13. The RWA to total assets 
ratio measures riskiness of assets of SCBs, whereas, 
CV measures the normalised dispersion among the 
bank-wise RWA to total assets ratio. A rising trend in 
RWA to total assets along with declining trend in CV 
indicates that the rise in proportion of risky assets in 
the total assets of SCBs is becoming more broad-based 
involving more banks (Chart 2.11).
2.25 Some possible reasons for the rise in the RWA 
to total assets could be the downgrading of some 
borrowers and rising NPAs. It was observed that the 
share of ‘A and above’ rated corporate exposures of 
SCBs, attracting less than 100 per cent risk weights, 
Chart 2.9: Credit Growth-Select Sectors
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.10: Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
10  Since June 2013, SCBs started reporting CRAR as per Basel III guidelines.
11  Total assets comprise on-balance sheet as well as off-balance sheet items.
12  Coeffi cient of Variation of a variable X = 
Standard Deviation of X
 Mean of X
13  This analysis is based on 63 SCBs and comprises 95 per cent assets of all SCBs.
 Chapter II Financial Institutions: Soundness and Resilience
28
declined from around 45 per cent of the total long 
term rated advances as at March 2009 to around 22 
per cent as at March 2013. Whereas, ‘BBB and below’ 
rated corporate exposures of SCBs, attracting risk 
weights in the range of 100 to 150 per cent, increased 
from around 55 per cent to around 78 per cent during 
same period.
Leverage
2.26 The Tier I leverage Ratio14 of SCBs was 6.4 per 
cent as at end September 2013 against 6.4 per cent 
and 6.1 per cent of March 2013 and September 2012, 
respectively. Among the bank-group level, NPBs 
recorded the highest Tier I leverage ratio at 9.1 per 
cent as at end September 2013, whereas, in the case 
of the PSBs, it was the lowest at 5.4 per cent 
(Chart 2.12).
Estimation of Losses15, Provisioning and Capital 
Adequacy
2.27 The estimated expected loss (EL) of SCBs at 
system level increased to 2.5 per cent of total advances 
as at end September 2013 from 2.1 per cent as at end 
14  Tier I Leverage Ratio is here defi ned as the ratio of Tier I capital to Total Assets. Total Assets includes off-balance sheet items also.
15  Procedure of Estimation of Losses is given in the Annex-2. Internationally, it is recommended to use estimated losses (EL & UL) approach for the 
purpose of making provisions and capital, for the next one year. For this purpose, PD is derived based on annual slippage. As the purpose of this study 
is to judge the adequacy of provisioning and capital levels being maintained by SCBs and not to estimate the required level of provisions and capital to 
be maintained for next one year, the PDs being used here is based on GNPA. 
Chart 2.12: Leverage Ratio of SCBs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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March 2013 and is expected to rise further to 2.8 per 
cent by September 2014 under baseline scenario 
(Table 2.4). Under severe stress conditions the EL 
could increase to 4.9 per cent by March 2015. The 
present level of total provisions16 being maintained 
by the SCBs at 2.8 per cent of total advances, may be 
just adequate under the baseline scenario, leaving a 
gap between the present provisioning level and EL 
under adverse macroeconomic conditions17. The 
unexpected loss (UL) and expected shortfall (ES) of 
SCBs are estimated to be around 7.4 per cent and 7.5 
per cent of total advances for the quarter ended 
September 2013. The corresponding losses may 
further rise to 10.6 per cent and 10.8 per cent as at 
end March 2015 under severe stress scenario. 
However, the Tier I capital to total advances ratio18 of 
12.5 per cent maintained by SCBs as at the end of 
September 2013 is suffi cient to cover the UL as well 
as the ES even under severe stress, though the 
adequacy of Tier I capital varies across banks.
Deteriorating Asset Quality
2.28 Asset quality continues to be a major concern 
for SCBs. The GNPA ratio of SCBs increased to 4.2 per 
cent as at end September 2013 from 3.4 per cent of 
March 2013. The restructured standard advances also 
increased to 6.0 per cent of total advances as at end 
16  Total Provisions include provisions for credit losses, risk provision for standard advances and provisions for restructured standard advances.
17  The stress scenarios have been defi ned in table 2.7 under macro-stress tests (Para 2.51).
18  This Tier I capital to total advances ratio is different from core CRAR and CRAR, which are defi ned as Tier I capital to RWA and Tier I & II capital to 
RWA, respectively.
19  Stressed Advances is defi ned as GNPA and restructured standard advances.
Table 2.4 Estimated Losses of SCBs
 (Per cent to Total Advances)
End-Quarter Expected Loss Unexpected Loss Expected Shortfall
Baseline Medium 
Stress
Severe 
Stress
Baseline Medium 
Stress
Severe 
Stress
Baseline Medium 
Stress
Severe 
Stress
Sep-13* 2.5 7.4 7.5
Mar-14 2.5 2.8 3.2 7.4 8.1 8.9 7.5 8.2 9.0
Sep-14 2.8 3.5 4.3 7.6 8.8 10.0 7.8 8.9 10.2
Mar-15 2.6 3.7 4.9 7.5 9.0 10.6 7.6 9.1 10.8
* Estimation of losses for the quarter ended September 2013 is based on the observed numbers.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
September 2013 from 5.8 per cent of March 2013. 
Overall the stressed advances19 rose signifi cantly to 
10.2 per cent of total advances as at end September 
2013 from 9.2 per cent of March 2013 (Chart 2.13).
2.29 Among the bank-groups, the public sector banks 
continue to have distinctly higher stressed advances 
at 12.3 per cent of total advances, of which restructured 
standard advances were around 7.4 per cent 
(Chart 2.13).
Chart 2.13: Asset Quality of SCBs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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Concerns on Restructuring
2.30 Concerns have emerged regarding the large and 
growing quantum of ‘forborne’ assets and their 
potential impact on the asset quality of banks. There 
was a sharp uptick in growth rate of restructured 
advances in 2008-09, due to relaxation in asset 
classifi cation for restructured advances granted by the 
Reserve Bank in the wake of the global fi nancial crisis. 
Thereafter, the growth rate of restructured advances 
has remained relatively high with the ratio of 
restructured advances to standard advances showing 
a secular increase and remaining above the GNPA ratio. 
The regulatory concern regarding restructuring arises 
from the possibility of the relaxations not being used 
judiciously by banks commensurate with the viability 
of projects. These relaxations for asset classifi cation/
provisioning will be phased out by April 1, 2015.
2.31 Bank-wise distribution of stressed advances to 
total Advances ratio shows that smaller banks have 
lower stressed advances than the system level average. 
The largest contribution comes from the PSU banks 
(Chart 2.14).
Size of Industries
2.32 The stressed advances of medium and large 
sized industries (including large projects) account for 
16.3 and 17.1 per cent of total advances to the 
respective segments, whereas, in the case of ‘micro & 
small’ sized industries stressed advances were around 
8.2 per cent of the total advances to the segment. The 
services sector has also been registering similar trend 
but their stressed advances ratio is lower than that of 
industries (Chart 2.15).
2.33 Medium & large segments of both industries and 
services taken together have stressed advances ratio 
around 14.5 per cent of total advances in that segment 
and in the case of public sector banks they are around 
17 per cent followed by old private banks at 13.6 per 
cent. Though the share of medium & large segments 
to total loans is the highest for foreign banks around 
74 per cent, the level of stressed advances in this bank-
Chart 2.15: Asset Quality at System Level: Industries’ Size-wise
Note: GNPA and Restructured Standard Advance to Total Advance in the 
respective segments.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.14: Distribution of Stressed Advances: Bank-wise-September 2013
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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group is only 4.2 per cent. The share of medium & large 
segments to total loans is the second largest for the 
public sector banks and they also have the highest 
s t r e s s e d  a d v a n c e s  i n  t h i s  s e g m e n t 
(Chart 2.16). Further, the medium and large segments, 
having a share of about 54 per cent in total advances, 
accounted for over 90 per cent of restructured accounts. 
The share of micro and small segments is marginal.
Sectors’ Contribution to GNPAs
2.34 Though agriculture recorded the highest GNPA 
ratio at 5.5 per cent as at end September 2013 followed 
by industries at 4.9 per cent, industries recorded the 
highest share in restructured standard advances as 
per cent of total advances at 10.9 per cent as at end 
September 2013. Industries thus contributed the 
highest share of stressed advances in their loans 
portfolio at 15.9 per cent as at end September 2013, 
followed by services at 7.6 per cent. Loans under the 
retail segment fared much better with GNPA and 
restructured standard advances to total advances at 
2.2 per cent and 0.3 per cent as at end September 
2013, respectively (Chart 2.17). Incidentally, the new 
private sector banks, having the largest share of retail 
segment in their loans portfolio around 30 per cent, 
seemed to have benefi ted in terms of better asset 
quality relative to other bank-groups. Public sector 
banks have the lowest share of retail segment in their 
loans portfolio - around 16 per cent (Chart 2.16).
2.35 There are fi ve sectors, namely, Infrastructure, 
Iron & Steel, Textiles, Aviation and Mining which have 
high level of stressed advances. At system level, these 
fi ve sectors together contribute around 24 percent of 
total advances of SCBs, and account for around 51 per 
cent of their total stressed advances (Table 2.5). 
2.36 The share of above mentioned fi ve sectors in 
the loans portfolio of Public Sector Banks is the 
highest around 55 per cent followed by Old Private 
Sector Banks.
2.37 There are various factors affecting the asset 
quality of SCBs adversely, such as the current 
Chart 2.16: Size-wise Asset Quality and Share: Bank-group wise (Sep-13)
Note: Stressed Advance Ratio is Stressed Advance to Total Advance in the 
respective segments.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.17: Asset Quality at System Level: Major Sectors
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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slowdown- global and domestic, persistent policy 
logjams, delayed clearances of various projects, 
aggressive expansion by corporate during the high 
growth phase, inadequate credit appraisal, etc.
Credit Appraisal
2.38 Before 2008, asset quality of SCBs was improving 
on a secular basis, following implementation of 
Prudential Guidelines. The GNPA ratio had declined 
sharply from 12.0 per cent as at end March 2001 to 
3.5 per cent as at end March 2006 and thereafter this 
ratio was fl at till March 2011. The GNPA ratio has been 
persistently rising since then. The trend is not 
uniform across bank – groups. It is possible that boom 
period credit disbursal was associated with less 
stringent credit appraisal, amongst various other 
factors that affected credit quality. During 2005-08, 
the Indian economy was growing at around 9 per cent, 
the y-o-y growth in loans moved up from 16 per cent 
in 2004 to a peak of 31 per cent in 2005-06. One of 
the major reasons behind this accelerated credit 
growth could be the competitive credit disbursal 
under the erstwhile PLR regime and surplus available 
with banks for credit due to sharp decline in the 
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) from 30.5 per cent of 
Chart 2.18: Performance of the Economy and NPAs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and CSO Data
Table 2.5:  Major Contributor to Stressed Advances of SCBs 
(Per cent)
Sector Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-13 Sep-13
Infrastructure Share in Total Advances 9.5 11.8 13.5 13.2 14.5 14.7
Share in Total Stressed Advances 8.3 8.8 8.4 21.2 27.6 30.3
Iron & Steel Share in Total Advances 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.9 4.7
Share in Total Stressed Advances 5.1 7.8 7.7 6.7 8.1 9.2
Textiles Share in Total Advances 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.4
Share in Total Stressed Advances 9.0 11.6 12.2 8.9 7.4 7.4
Aviation Share in Total Advances 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5
Share in Total Stressed Advances 0.1 1.1 1.8 6.3 3.5 3.5
Mining Share in Total Advances 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Share in Total Stressed Advances 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8
Total of these Sectors Share in Total Advances 18.6 21.3 23.3 22.6 24.2 23.9
Share in Total Stressed Advances 22.8 29.5 30.5 43.3 47.2 51.1
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
total assets as at end March 2005 to 22.6 per cent as 
at end March 2008. In addition, the push for 
infrastructure projects, many of which later got into 
a logjam, also resulted in accelerated growth in GNPAs 
since 2006 (Chart 2.18).
2.39 Early detection and prompt corrective action in 
problem accounts, concerted efforts at recovery, 
improvements in corporate governance, accountability 
at all levels, a more supportive legal infrastructure, 
etc. could go a long way in addressing issues related 
to asset quality. These issues are being addressed 
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through policy guidelines being framed by the Reserve 
Bank. In this context, Reserve Bank has brought out 
a discussion paper on “Early Recognition of Financial 
Distress, Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair 
Recovery for Lenders: Framework for Revitalising 
Distressed Assets in the Economy” (Box 2.1).
In order to ensure that the banking system recognises 
fi nancial distress early, takes prompt steps to resolve it, 
and ensures fair recovery for lenders and investors, the 
Reserve Bank has come up with a discussion paper which 
outlines a corrective action plan that will incentivize early 
identifi cation of problem cases, timely restructuring of 
accounts which are considered to be viable, and prompt 
steps by banks for recovery or sale of unviable accounts. 
The major proposal in the discussion papers are as 
follows:
 Early formation of a lenders’ committee with 
timelines to agree to a plan for resolution: When 
principal or interest payment overdue between 61-91 
days, all lenders, including NBFC-SIs, should form 
a lenders’ committee to be called Joint Lenders’ 
Forum (JLF) under a convener and formulate a joint 
corrective action plan (CAP) for early resolution of 
the stress in the account. JLF formation and 
subsequent corrective actions will be mandatory in 
accounts having aggregate fund-based and non-fund 
based exposures of `1000 million and above. Even 
in other cases lenders have to monitor the asset 
quality and take corrective actions for effective 
resolution as deemed appropriate, under our extant 
guidelines. The option under CAP by the JLF would 
generally include; rectifi cation, restructuring and 
recovery.
 Incentives for lenders to agree collectively and quickly 
to a plan – better regulatory treatment of stressed 
assets if a resolution plan is underway, accelerated 
provisioning if no agreement can be reached.
 Improvement in current restructuring process: 
Independent evaluation of large value restructurings 
mandated, with a focus on viable plans and a fair 
sharing of losses (and future possible upside) 
between promoters and creditors.
 More expensive future borrowing for borrowers who 
do not co-operate with lenders in resolution.
 Lenders should carry out their independent and 
objective credit appraisal in all cases and must not 
depend on credit appraisal reports prepared by 
outside consultants, especially the in-house 
consultants of the borrower company. Lenders 
should ascertain the source and quality of equity 
capital brought in by the promoters /shareholders. 
While carrying out the credit appraisal, banks should 
verify as to whether the names of any of the directors 
of the companies appear in the list of defaulters/ 
willful defaulters. Further, with a view to ensuring 
proper end-use of funds and preventing diversion/
siphoning of funds by the borrowers, lenders could 
consider engaging auditors for specifi c certifi cation 
purpose without relying on certifi cation given by 
borrower’s auditors.
  More liberal regulatory treatment of asset sales;
 Lenders can spread loss on sale over two years 
provided loss is fully disclosed.
 Takeout fi nancing/refi nancing possible over a 
longer period and will not be construed as 
restructuring.
 Leveraged buyouts will be allowed for specialised 
entities for acquisition of ‘stressed companies’.
 Steps to enable better functioning of Asset 
Reconstruction Companies mooted.
 Sector-specifi c companies/private equity fi rms 
encouraged to play active role in stressed assets 
market.
Box 2.1: Discussion Paper on ‘Early Recognition of Financial Distress, Prompt Steps for Resolution and Fair 
Recovery for Lenders: Framework for Revitalising Distressed Assets in the Economy’
Components of NPA: Recovery Management
2.40 Over time, share of upgradation in the 
reduction of NPAs has increased signifi cantly, while 
write-offs continued to be the highest contributor. 
Though reduction in NPAs due to write-offs can help 
banks manage their tax liabilities on impaired loans, 
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it impacts their profitability and ability to raise 
resources (Chart 2.19). While recurring and systemic 
write-offs are a concern for the regulator, the banks’ 
boards are expected to be judicious in permitting write 
offs.
2.41 The y-o-y growth in slippages has increased 
after the recent financial crisis.  However, 
simultaneously, y-o-y growth in upgradation of NPAs 
has also increased though the trends have been 
diverse across bank groups. (Chart 2.19).
2.42 The ratio of slippages to recovery and 
upgradation for the banking sector as a whole 
deteriorated from a low of 125.4 per cent in 2005-06 
to 264.1 per cent during 2009-10 and remained 
elevated at 257.0 per cent in 2012-13. Recovery 
performance also varied widely across banks.
Other Issues
2.43 Excessive volatlity in INR could affect corporates 
with unhedged exposures, eventually leading to 
adverse impact on asset quality of banks. An 
assessment of the exact quantum of unhedged 
exposures of corporates is diffi cult with the current 
level of information available. To minimize the risk, 
banks have been advised to price the risk of unhedged 
exposures into their credit risk premia, during their 
credit appraisal. Reserve Bank has also issued draft 
guidelines requiring banks to make incremental 
provisions and capital based on the estimated likely 
losses for corporates from such unhedged forex 
exposures.
Profi tability
2.44 The profi tability of all SCBs, measured by return 
on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) declined 
to 0.8 per cent and 10.2 per cent in September 2013, 
respectively, from 1.0 per cent and 12.9 per cent in 
March 2013. The growth in profi t after tax (PAT) 
decelerated to -9.7 per cent during September 2013 
from 12.9 per cent of March 2013, mainly due to the 
lower growth in net interest income, higher risk 
provisions and write-offs. Y-o-Y growth in other 
operating income increased to 30.5 per cent during 
Chart 2.19: Movement in Various Components of NPAs
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
September 2013 from 14.4 per cent of March 2013 
due to the higher income from fee based services and 
forex operations (Table 2.6).
2.45 Withdrawal of the special concessions in terms 
of asset classification/provisioning provided on 
restructuring, would lead to increase in provisioning 
requirements of the banking sector especially for PSBs. 
Further, banks are required to estimate and make 
provisions for employee benefi ts including pension 
and other superannuation benefi ts based on actuarial 
valuations as per AS-15. The IBA guidance note dated 
February 26, 2013 on funding superannuation 
benefi ts to be followed uniformly by all banks, could 
also translate into additional provisioning 
requirements.
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Performance of Overseas Branches of Indian Banks
2.46 Indian banks are operating at important 
fi nancial centres spread over 55 countries through 
branches, subsidiaries,  joint ventures and 
representative offi ces (ROs). They had a network of 
178 branches (including Overseas Banking Units 
(OBUs)), 24 subsidiaries, 7 joint ventures and 54 ROs 
as at end March 2013 as against 165 branches 
(including OBUs), 24 subsidiaries, 6 joint ventures 
and 55 ROs as at end March 2012.
2.47 Inter-bank borrowings and customer deposits 
are the major components of the liabilities of overseas 
branches of Indian banks, which together contribute 
around 73 per cent of total liabilities. Customer credit 
and interbank placement are the major components 
of the total assets of overseas branches, which 
together contributes around 86 per cent of total assets 
(Chart 2.20)
2.48 The total assets of overseas branches of Indian 
banks increased by USD 25.6 billion to USD 154.9 
billion as at March 31, 2013 mainly due to the increase 
in customer credit (gross) by USD 15.3 billion and 
inter-bank placement by USD 7.6 billion over the 
previous year. This asset growth was funded mainly 
by inter-bank borrowings (USD 9.3 billion), customer 
deposits (USD 8.8 billion and other debt instruments 
(USD 4.9 billion).
Table 2.6: Profi tability of SCBs
(Per cent)
Y-o-Y Growth
Return on 
Assets
Return on 
Equity
Net Interest 
Income 
Growth
Other Operating 
Income Growth
Earning Before 
Provisions & 
Taxes Growth
Risk 
Provisions 
Growth
Profi t Before 
Tax Growth
Profi t After 
Tax Growth
Mar-09 24.4 24.0 33.1 35.5 27.2 23.3 1.1 14.5
Mar-10 14.8 3.1 9.2 13.2 1.7 4.3 1.0 12.9
Mar-11 34.6 0.5 21.7 38.6 26.2 23.6 1.1 13.6
Mar-12 15.8 7.4 15.3 35.6 10.2 14.6 1.1 13.4
Mar-13 10.8 14.4 9.9 10.2 10.3 12.9 1.0 12.9
Sep-13 11.6 30.5 12.8 63.2 -7.6 -9.7 0.8 10.2
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.20: Liabilities and Assets Composition of Overseas Branches 
of Indian Banks- March 2013 
(Per cent)
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2.49 Gross problem assets (credit plus investments) 
of the overseas branches had risen sharply by 78 per 
cent to USD 1.8 billion as at end March 2013 from USD 
1.0 billion of March 2012. Consequently, the ratio of 
problem assets to total assets has gone up to 1.2 per 
cent in March 2013 from 0.8 per cent in March 2012.
2.50 The aggregate net profit of the overseas 
branches of Indian banks during FY: 2012-13 declined 
by 7.3 per cent to USD 1.4 billion against increase of 
net profi t by 24.6 per cent during the last fi nancial 
year. This decline in net profi t growth resulted in fall 
of RoA of overseas branches of Indian banks to 0.9 
per cent as at end March 2013 from 1.3 per cent of 
March 2012.
Resilience - Stress Tests
Macro Stress Test - Credit Risk
2.51 The resilience of the Indian banking system to 
macroeconomic shocks is tested through a series of 
macro stress tests for credit risk at the system, bank-
group and sector level. These tests encompass assumed 
risk scenarios incorporating a baseline and two adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios representing medium and 
severe risk (Table 2.7). The adverse scenarios were 
derived broadly based on 0.5 to 1.0 standard deviation 
for medium risk and 1.25 to 2.0 standard deviation for 
severe risk (10 years historical data).
System Level Credit Risk
2.52 The macro stress tests on credit risk suggest 
that under baseline scenario, GNPA ratio of all SCBs 
is expected to rise to around 4.6 per cent by September 
2014 from 4.2 per cent as at end September 2013, 
which may subsequently improve to 4.4 per cent by 
March 2015 if the macroeconomic conditions 
improve. Whereas, if the macroeconomic conditions 
deteriorate further, the GNPA may rise further and 
under severe stress conditions, it could move upto 
7.0 per cent by March 2015. Under such severe risk 
scenario, the system level CRAR of SCBs could decline 
to 11.1 per cent by March 2015, but still remain above 
the regulatory requirement of 9 per cent (Chart 2.21).
Table 2.7: Macroeconomic Scenario Assumptions20
(Per cent)
FY Macro-variable Baseline Medium Stress Severe Stress
20
13
-1
4*
GDP Growth 5.0 3.6 2.0
WPI Infl ation 6.5 8.2 10.2
Short-term Interest Rate 8.4 9.6 11.1
Exports to GDP Ratio 15.2 13.9 12.4
Gross Fiscal Defi cit 4.8 5.6 6.6
20
14
-1
5
GDP Growth 5.8 3.6 1.5
WPI Infl ation 6.0 8.6 12.5
Short-term Interest Rate 8.3 10.3 12.2
Exports to GDP Ratio 15.4 13.4 11.4
Gross Fiscal Defi cit 4.7 6.0 7.4
* Average for the last two quarters (December & March) of 2013-14.
Chart 2.21: Projection of System Level GNPAs & CRAR of SCBs
Note: The projection of system level GNPA has been done using three 
different but complementary econometric models, viz., Multivariate 
regression, Vector Autoregression (which takes into accounts feedback 
impact of credit quality to macro variables and interaction effects) and 
Quantile regression (which can deals tail risk and takes into account non-
linear impact of macroeconomic shocks).
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
20  These stress scenarios are stringent and conservative assessments under hypothetical-severely adverse economic conditions and should not be 
interpreted as forecasts or expected outcomes.
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Bank Group Level Credit Risk
2.53 Among the bank-groups, public sector banks 
are expected to register the highest GNPA ratio. Under 
baseline scenario, the GNPA of PSBs and foreign banks 
may be around 4.9 per cent and 4.3 per cent by March 
2015, respectively. Whereas, GNPA ratio of old private 
banks and new private banks are expected to rise to 
2.6 per cent and 2.7 per cent by March 2015, 
respectively, from 2.4 per cent and 1.9 per cent of 
September 2014 (Chart 2.22).
2.54 CRAR of PSBs, which is the lowest at 11.2 per 
cent, may decline further to 9.6 per cent by March 
2015 under severe stress scenario, thus moving much 
closer to the minimum capital requirement. Under 
Note: Projection of GNPA at bank-group level was done using multivariate regression model, which does not take into account feedback and non-linear 
impact impacts.
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
such severe risk scenario, the CRAR of new private 
sector banks, old private banks and foreign banks may 
decline to 14.0 per cent, 12.2 per cent and 15.7 per 
cent by March 2015 from 15.9 per cent, 14.5 per cent 
and 16.3 per cent recorded as at end September 2013, 
respectively (Chart 2.22).
Sector Level Credit Risk
2.55 Macro stress test of sector level credit risk 
revealed that among the selected seven sectors, 
Construction sector is expected to have highest NPA 
ratio around 7.7 per cent (under baseline) by March 
2015 followed by Iron & Steel. However, the adverse 
macroeconomic shocks seem to have maximum 
impact on Iron & Steel and Engineering (Chart 2.23).
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.23: Projected Sector-wise NPA
(Per cent of gross advances)
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Sensitivity Analysis21 - Top-Down Stress Tests - Bank 
Level
2.56 A number of single factor sensitivity stress tests 
(top-down)22 were carried out on SCBs (60 banks 
comprising 99 per cent of total banking sector assets) 
to assess their vulnerabilities and resilience under 
various shocks and scenarios. The resilience of the 
commercial banks in respect of credit, interest rate 
and liquidity risks were studied through top down 
sensitivity analysis by imparting extreme but 
plausible shocks. The results are based on September 
2013 data.
Credit Risk
2.57 Under different static credit shocks as on 
September 2013, the system level CRAR of SCBs still 
remained above the required minimum of 9 per cent 
(Chart 2.24). The capital losses at the system level 
could be about 15 per cent in the case of severe stress 
condition (shock 1). Further, under this scenario, the 
impact on profitability of banks would be quite 
signifi cant as their entire profi t (before tax) would be 
lost and the system level (tier I) leverage ratio23 would 
come down from 6.6 per cent to 5.3 per cent. The 
stress test results further showed that 28 percent 
banks, sharing about 43 percent of SCBs’ total assets, 
would fail to maintain required CRAR with 100 per 
cent assumed rise in NPAs (shock 1). Also leverage 
ratio of 15 percent banks, sharing about 11 percent 
of SCBs’ total assets, would fall below 3 percent under 
this scenario.
21  The sensitivity analysis is done in addition to macro stress tests; while in the former shocks are given directly to asset quality (NPAs), in the latter, 
shocks are in terms of adverse macroeconomic conditions, Also, macro stress tests are done at system, bank-group and sectoral levels, whereas, sensitivity 
analysis was done at system, bank-group and bank levels.
22  For details on stress tests, please refer to the Annex-2. The provisioning norms used for these stress tests are based on existing average prescribed 
provisioning for different asset categories, instead of enhanced provisioning requirements considered in earlier FSRs. The provisioning requirements 
have been taken as 25, 75 and 100 per cent for sub-standard, doubtful and loss advances, respectively. Further, the norms have been applied only on 
the additional NPAs, calculated under a stress-scenario, instead of on the entire credit portfolio. As a result of assumed increase in NPAs, loss of income 
on the additional NPAs for one quarter is also included in total losses in addition to additional provisioning requirements. This aims to provide a more 
realistic loss estimates under the assumed stress scenarios. 
23  Leverage ratio is defi ned as a percentage of Tier I capital to Total Assets (On-balance-sheet-Assets + Off-Balance-Sheet-Credit-equivalent).
Chart 2.24: Credit Risk
Shock 1: NPAs increases by 100 per cent
Shock 2: 30 percent of restructured advances turn into NPAs (Sub-
Standard category)
Shock 3: 30 percent of restructured advances are written-off (Loss 
category)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
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2.58 The impact of credit shocks on Public Sector 
Banks are more pronounced which would bring down 
their CRAR from 11.2 per cent to 9.2 per cent under 
shock1 (100 per cent increase in NPAs). Under the 
assumed stress scenario (shock1), the leverage ratio 
of PSBs would also be down by 165 basis points.
2.59 The stress tests on credit concentration risk of 
banks show that the impact under various stress 
scenarios is signifi cant for about 7 per cent of banks, 
comprising 5 percent of assets, failing to maintain 9 
percent CRAR. The impact on CRAR, at the system 
level, under the assumed scenarios of default of top 
three individual borrowers and default of top group 
borrower would be 259 and 98 basis points respectively 
and the system should be able to withstand these 
shocks (Chart 2.25).
Interest Rate Risk
2.60 The interest rate risk in the trading book (direct 
impact on AFS and HFT portfolio of banks) under 
various stress scenarios is manageable with reduction 
in CRAR by 71 basis points at the system level, with 
a few small banks getting impacted adversely. The 
total capital loss at system level would be about 5.6 
per cent. This impact is due to upward movement 
(2.5 percentage points) of yield curve, especially for 
the low maturity buckets because of their relatively 
large size. However, the impact in terms of profi tability 
of banks would be signifi cant with about 38 per cent 
of profi t (before tax) of banks being lost under the 
above shock. The impact of interest rate shock on the 
trading book has reduced from the estimate of 111 
basis points provided in the previous FSR on account 
of shifting of a few investments from trading book to 
HTM under the regulatory relaxation provided in 
August 2013. For an assumed shock of 2.5 percentage 
points parallel upward shift of the yield curve, the 
impact on the HTM portfolio of banks, if marked-to-
market, could be about 3.1 percentage points on the 
capital, an increase over the 2.6 percentage points 
reported in FSR-June 2013.
Chart 2.25: Credit Risk: Concentration
Shock 1: The top individual borrower defaults
Shock 2: The top two individual borrowers defaults
Shock 3: The top three individual borrowers defaults
Shock 4: The top group borrower defaults
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Liquidity Risk
2.61 To capture the impact on the liquidity risk, 
analysis has been done with fi ve defi nitions of liquid 
assets. As per these defi nitions, the liquid assets 
comprise of Cash, CRR, Inter-bank-deposits and 
Investments. Different liquid asset ratios are arrived 
at using various definitions under the baseline 
scenario. The stress scenarios are constructed to test 
the ability of banks to meet a run on their deposits 
using only their liquid assets. It is assumed that 
(1) ten per cent of total deposits would be withdrawn 
in a short period (say 1 or 2 days) and (2) three per 
cent of total deposits would be withdrawn in each 
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day for 5 consecutive days. Under the stress scenarios, 
there were indications of deterioration in the liquidity 
position of banks though SLR investments helped the 
banks to ward off the liquidity pressure; so also CRR 
deposits to some extent helped to overcome sudden 
and unexpected withdrawal by depositors 
(Chart 2.26).
Derivatives Portfolio of Banks
2.62 The derivatives portfolio of banks in India grew 
sharply in the years leading up to the global fi nancial 
crisis. Though the portfolio size has shrunk since 
2008, it still remains large with the outstanding 
notional principal constituting over 130 per cent of 
banks’ total assets as on September 30, 2013. The 
credit equivalent of derivatives portfolio is about 5 
per cent of the balance sheet assets. The foreign banks 
as a group account for about 62 per cent of the 
outstanding notional principal in the derivatives 
market, whereas their share in the balance sheet 
assets of the banking system is only 7.3 per cent. 
There was a marginal increase in the size of 
outstanding notional principal and their credit 
equivalent in September 2013 (Chart 2.27 and 2.28)
2.63 Among the sample banks24, the majority of 
outstanding derivative transactions are interbank 
Chart 2.26: Liquidity Risk
Liquid Assets Defi nitions
1 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits + SLR Investments
2 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Investments maturing-within-1-month
3 Cash + Excess CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Excess SLR Investments
4 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Investments maturing-within-1-month
5 Cash + CRR + Inter Bank Deposits maturing-within-
1-month + Excess SLR Investments
A baseline and two shock scenarios have been constructed for each of 
the above defi nitions.
Liquidity Shocks
Shock1 10 percent deposits withdrawal (cumulative) in a short 
period (say 1 or 2 days)
Shock2 3 percent deposits withdrawal (each day) within 5 days
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns and Staff Calculations
Chart 2.27: Trend in Notional Principal of Derivatives
(Per cent to Total Assets)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
24  Stress tests on derivatives portfolios were conducted for a sample of 24 select banks. Details are in Annex-2.
Chart 2.28: Trend in Credit Equivalent of Derivatives
(Per cent to Total Assets)
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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transactions. The average interbank segment of the 
derivatives portfolio constituted about 83 per cent of 
the total outstanding derivatives as at September 
2013. The customer segment constituted a small 
portion of outstanding derivative transactions 
covering 17 per cent on an average basis. Interestingly 
the coverage of the customer segment of the public 
and private sector banks within the overall outstanding 
derivatives transaction exceeded 20 per cent on an 
average basis (Chart 2.29).
2.64 A series of bottom-up stress tests (sensitivity 
analysis) on derivative portfolios were conducted for 
the select sample with the reference date as September 
30, 2013. The banks in the sample reported the results 
of four separate shocks on interest and foreign 
exchange rates. The shocks on the interest rates 
ranged from 100 to 250 basis points, while 20 per cent 
appreciation / depreciation shocks were assumed for 
foreign exchange rates. The stress tests were carried 
out for individual shocks, on stand-alone basis. The 
results showed that the average net impact of interest 
rate shocks on sample banks was not high. However, 
the foreign exchange shock scenarios showed 
relatively large impact in September 2013 position 
due to the depreciated rupee rate prevailing at that 
time (Chart 2.30).
Securities Market-Possible Concentration Risks 
Due to Common Set of Banks in SGF
2.65 The exposures of Settlement Guarantee Funds 
(SGF) of NSCCL and ICCL to the top 5 banks are 22.9 
per cent and 21.8 per cent, respectively, which are 
well below the exposure limits specifi ed by NSCCL, 
SGF of 75 per cent to top fi ve banks put together. 
While the exposure of the SGF of NSCCL and the 
exposure of the SGF of ICCL are individually less than 
the upper limit, the fact that three banks are common 
in the list of top fi ve banks, makes it even more 
important that the exposures limits are monitored 
on an ongoing basis (Table 2.8).
Chart 2.30: Stress Tests - Impact of shocks on Derivative Portfolio of 
Select Banks (Change in net MTM on application of a shock)
(Per cent to Capital Funds)
Source: Sample Banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Chart 2.29: Share of Inter-bank & Customer Segments in Derivatives 
Transactions – September 2013
(Per cent to Total Assets)
PSB: Public Sector Bank, PB: Private Sector Bank, FB: Foreign Bank
Source: Sample Banks (Bottom-up stress tests on derivate portfolio)
Table 2.8: Exposure of NSCCL and ICCL to Top Five Banks 
as at end September 2013
NSCCL of NSE ICCL of BSE
Sr. 
No.
Bank Name Exposure as a 
% of SGF
Sr. 
No.
Bank Name Exposure as a 
% of SGF
1. Bank 1 8.3 1. Bank 1 7.3
2. Bank 2 6.2 2. Bank 2 5.6
3. Bank 3 4.2 3. Bank 3 4.6
4. Bank 4 2.4 4. Bank 4 2.6
5. Bank 5 1.9 5. Bank 5 1.6
Total Exposure 
to Top 5 Banks
22.9 Total Exposure 
to Top 5 Banks
21.8
Note: In case of BSE exposure is a % of SGF+Total Liquid Assets
Source: NSE & BSE
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Regional Rural Banks (RRBs)
2.66 RRBs account for around 2.6 per cent of the 
banking assets. Gross loans and deposits of 64 RRBs 
went up by 20.2 per cent and 13.5 per cent during 
2012-13, respectively, thus raising the CD ratio to 66.1 
per cent as at end March 2013 from 62.5 per cent of 
March 2012. The GNPA as per cent of gross loans 
increased to 5.7 per cent as at March 2013 from 5.0 
per cent of March 2012.
Amalgamation of RRBs
2.67 The process of consolidating RRBs was initiated 
in the year 2005. In the fi rst phase of amalgamation 
of RRBs which took place between 2005 and 2010, 
RRBs of the same sponsor banks within a state were 
amalgamated bringing down their number to 82 from 
196. In the current phase of amalgamation, which 
started from October 1, 2012, the Government of 
India(GoI) plans to mainly amalgamate geographically 
contiguous RRBs within a state under different sponsor 
banks to have just one RRB in medium sized states 
and 2 or 3 RRBs in large states. GoI has so far issued 
18 notifi cations amalgamating 41 RRBs into 17 new 
RRBs within 11 states bringing down their effective 
number to 58. Consequent to the consolidation of RRBs 
a minimum CRAR of 8 per cent has been prescribed 
on an ongoing basis with effect from March 31, 2014.
Financial Institutions
2.68 There are four Financial Institutions (FIs) which 
are under the purview of the Reserve Bank three of 
these, namely, NABARD, SIDBI and NHB are refi nancing 
institutions(RFIs), whereas, fourth FI, EXIM Bank is 
a term lending institution (TLI). Total assets of these 
FIs together is `4197.5billion and they are highly 
capitalized with CRAR of all the four FIs taken together 
is 18.8 per cent (ranging between 14 to 31 per cent) 
as at end September 2013 which is well above the 
minimum regulatory requirement of 9 per cent. 
Further, these have GNPAs to total gross advances at 
0.9 per cent as at end September 2013.
25  System of 51 SUCBs.
2.69 For long term economic growth, infrastructure 
development is an important pre requesite. The 
banking system with its current ALM has borne the 
burden of fi nancing to a large extent and is showing 
resultant strains. To ensure availability of substantial 
and long-term-maturity it may be necessary to revisit 
the mandate of these institutions and involve them 
to a greater extent.
Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs)
2.70 The SUCBs account for 1.5 per cent of the assets 
of the banking system. At the system level25, the CRAR 
of SUCBs declined to 12.5 per cent as at end September 
2013 from 12.7 per cent as at end March 2013 but 
remained above the minimum regulatory requirement 
of 9 per cent, whereas, at bank level, seven banks 
failed to maintain the minimum required CRAR. The 
asset quality of SUCBs, measured in terms of GNPA, 
deteriorated signifi cantly to 7.5 per cent of gross 
advances as at end September 2013 from 3.6 per cent 
as at end March 2013, resulting in signifi cant decline 
in the provision coverage ratio to 55.3 per cent as at 
end September 2013 from 77.3 per cent as at end 
March 2013. The profi tability of SUCBs, measured in 
terms of RoA declined to 0.7 per cent as at end 
September 2013 form 0.9 per cent as at end March 
2013. However, liquidity ratio improved to 34.9 per 
cent as at end September 2013 from 34.0 per cent as 
at end March 2013 (Table 2.9).
Table 2.9: Select Financial Soundness Indicators of SUCBs
(Per cent)
Mar-13 Sep-13
CRAR 12.7 12.5
Gross NPAs to Gross Advances 3.6 7.5
Return on Assets (annualized) 0.9 0.7
Liquidity Ratio 34.0 34.9
Provision Coverage Ratio 77.3 55.3
Note:
1. Data are provisional and based on OSS Returns
2. Liquidity Ratio = 100 * (Cash + due from banks + SLR investment) / 
Total Assets.
3. PCR = NPA provisions held as per cent of Gross NPAs.
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2.71 Stress test for assessment of credit risk was 
carried out for SUCBs using the data based on Off-Site 
Surveillance (OSS) returns as on September 30, 2013. 
The impact of credit risk shocks on the CRAR of the 
SUCBs was observed under four different scenarios26. 
The results showed that except under the extreme 
fourth scenario, the system level CRAR of SUCBs 
remained above the minimum regulatory required 
level of CRAR, though individually a larger number 
of banks (more than 50 per cent banks) failed to meet 
the required level of CRAR.
2.72 Stress test on liquidity risk was carried out 
under two different scenarios assuming 50 per cent 
and 100 per cent increase in cash outfl ows in the 1 to 
28 days time bucket. It was further assumed that there 
was no change in cash inflows under both the 
scenarios. The stress test results indicate that the 
SUCBs would be signifi cantly impacted (around 50 
per cent banks) even under less severe stress scenario 
(scenario I).
2.73 The Reserve Bank adopted a multi-layered 
regulatory and supervisory strategy aimed at the 
consolidation of UCBs by way of merger/amalgamation 
of viable UCBs and the exit of unviable banks for the 
revival of this sector, which led to a gradual reduction 
in the number of UCBs. The closures of UCBs were 
due to various reasons such as high non-performing 
advances, negative net-worth, deterioration in 
fi nancial health, non-compliance with RBI guidelines, 
frauds, affairs conducted in a manner detrimental to 
the interests of depositors, misappropriation of funds, 
sanctioning of loans in excess of permissible limit, 
sanctioning of loans to the entity in which directors 
have interest, etc. The total number of UCBs as at end 
March 2013 stood at 1606 as against 1618 as at end 
March 2012 (Table 2.10).
Rural Co-operative Banks
Systemic Implications of some Rural Cooperative 
Banks continuing without licence
2.74 Pursuant to the recommendations of the 
Committee on Financial Sector Assessment (CFSA), 
the RBI had revised the licensing norms for rural co-
operative banks during October 2009. Accordingly, all 
31 State Co-operative Banks and 348 District Central 
Co-operative Banks (DCCBs) were licensed as on 30 
June 2013, whereas, 23 DCCBs in four States had 
remained unlicensed.
2.75 These 23 DCCBs are not complying with Section 
11(1), 22(3)(a) and 22 (3)(b) of BR Act, 1949. These 
banks have large accumulated losses and have shown 
erosion of assets as well as of deposits. Since, allowing 
these DCCBs to continue banking business would be 
detrimental to the interest of depositors, Reserve 
Bank had imposed directions on these banks 
restraining them from acceptance of fresh deposits 
with effect from May 9, 2012 and thereafter Show-
Cause Notices were issued to them on March 7, 2013 
Table 2.10: Consolidation in UCB sector
Financial
Year (FY)
Number of UCBs
Operational 
as on last 
day of 
previous FY
Merged 
during 
FY
Cancel-
lation of 
licenses / 
rejection of 
applica-
tions for 
license*
Closed 
during FY
(5)=(3) 
+(4)
Opera-
tional as 
on last 
day of 
current 
FY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2008-09 1,770 22 27 49 1,721
2009-10 1,721 13 34 47 1,674
2010-11 1,674 13 16 29 1,645
2011-12 1,645 14 13 27 1,618
2012-13 1,618 3 9 12 1,606
*Rejection of application of the existing urban co-operative credit 
societies for license
26  Four scenarios are; i) 50 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into sub-standard advances, ii) 50 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into loss advances), 
iii) 100 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into sub-standard advances, and iv) 100 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into loss advances).
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to Show-Cause as to why their licence application to 
carry on banking business in India should not be 
rejected. Further regulatory action against these banks 
is being examined now.
Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)27
Capital Adequacy
2.76 Capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) 
norms were made applicable to NBFCs-ND-SI w.e.f. 
April, 200728, in terms of which every systemically 
important non-deposit taking NBFC is required to 
maintain a minimum capital, consisting of Tier-I and 
Tier- II capital, of not less than 15 per cent of its 
aggregate risk-weighted assets. The aggregate CRAR 
of the ND-SI sector stood at 28.4 per cent for the 
quarter ended September 2013 as against 27.4 per 
cent in the corresponding quarter of 2012 (Chart 2.31).
Asset Quality
2.77 The gross NPA ratio of the ND-SI sector stood 
at 3.5 per cent for the quarter ended September 2013 
as against 3.1 per cent for the same quarter in the 
preceding year (Chart 2.32).
Stress Tests - Credit Risk
System level (NBFC-D and NBFC-ND-SI)
2.78 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC sector 
(includes both deposit taking and ND-SI) for the 
period ended September 2013 was carried out under 
two scenarios (i) where gross NPA increased two times 
and (ii) gross NPA increased 5 times from the current 
level. It was observed that in the fi rst scenario, CRAR 
dropped by 1.1 percentage points from 23.5 to 22.4 
per cent while in the second scenario CRAR dropped 
by 4.9 percentage points (CRAR dropped from 23.5 to 
18.6 per cent). It may be concluded that even though 
there was shortfall in provisioning under both the 
scenarios, the impact on CRAR was negligible as the 
sector had a higher level of CRAR at 23.5 per cent as 
against the bench mark CRAR of 15 per cent.
27  NBFCs-ND-SI (Non-Deposit taking and Systemically Important NBFCs) only used in this analysis. 
28  Vide Notifi cation No. DNBS.193 DG (VL) 2007, dated 22-02-2007
Chart 2.31: Trends in Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
Chart 2.32: Trends in Gross NPA Ratio
Source: RBI Supervisory Returns
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Select NBFCs
2.79 A stress test on credit risk for individual NBFCs 
for the period ended September 2013 was also carried 
out under two scenarios, viz., (i) gross NPA increased 
two times and (ii) gross NPA increased 5 times from 
the current level. As at the end of September, 2013 
around 4.8 per cent of the companies were unable 
to comply with the minimum regulatory capital 
requirement of 15 per cent. The percentage of NBFCs, 
not able to meet the minimum required level of 
capital adequacy went up to 8.6 per cent and 13.4 per 
cent under the fi rst and second stress scenarios 
respectively.
Insurance Sector
2.80 The Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) vide Fifth Amendment to the 
Investment Regulations during 2013 has taken several 
policy changes, which include, increasing the scope 
of investments in AA rated bonds, thrust to 
investments in infrastructure, controls to protect the 
policyholders interest, restricting the insurer to invest 
in bonds which are rated below A to the prescribed 
percentage, etc.
2.81 The total investment of insurance sector 
increased by 11.1 per cent to `18.7 trillion as at end 
March 2013 from ` 16.8 trillion as at end March 2012, 
which further increased by 11.6 per cent during fi rst 
quarter of 2013-14 to ` 19.2 trillion as at end June 2013.
The life insurance continues to be contributor in the 
investment of insurance sector with share of 93.3 per 
cent as at end June 2013.
2.82 Most of the Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of 
insurances sector are with PSU insurers and recorded 
82.6 per cent growth on y-o-y basis during 2012-13 to 
`70.1 billion as at end March 2013. Whereas, NPAs of 
private sector insures was ` 0.1 billion as at end March 
2013.
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Chapter III
Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
India stands committed to the implementation of the global regulatory reforms and has made considerable progress 
on this front. Globally, the policies aimed at ending ‘too-big-to-fail’ have not been entirely successful at the ground 
level. In India, the process of identification of financial conglomerates and their joint supervision/ regulation has 
received a lot of attention. Some global reform measures, e.g. those related to shadow banking may need to be 
adopted selectively, based on their relevance to the domestic financial system. The so called shadow banks in India 
have a key role in expanding the reach of the formal financial system to the remote corners of the country. Emerging 
regulatory gaps and scope for arbitrage need to be kept in view, while ensuring a healthy growth of the non- banking 
financial sector.
Recent instances of manipulation of benchmarks and prices in international financial markets once more brought 
into focus the role of greed and the failure of self regulation of financial markets. India has set up a committee to 
review the systems and procedures in place with regard to the major financial benchmarks used in domestic markets.
The initiatives by regulators towards installing centralised databases for large common credit exposures of banks, 
corporate debentures and insurance policy records are expected to improve the information flow and functioning 
of the financial system. The work on LEI system is also underway.
The Financial Stability and Development Council and its Sub-Committee have been spearheading the work on 
systemic risk assessment, financial sector development, inter regulatory coordination, financial inclusion and 
literacy and implementation of regulations to foster financial stability.
Global Regulatory Reforms
Ending Too-Big-To-Fail
3.1 One of objectives of the reforms after the global 
fi nancial crisis (GFC) was to develop and implement 
a policy framework to ensure that systemically-
important financial institutions (SIFIs) could be 
resolved without resorting to taxpayer support and/
or causing disruption to the fi nancial system. The 
global SIFIs (G-SIFIs) were to be subjected to higher 
capital requirements and more stringent supervisory 
standards for risk management, data aggregation, risk 
governance and internal controls. The national 
resolution regimes were to be strengthened. As part 
of G-SIFIs, an initial group of global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs) were identifi ed in 2011, 
using a methodology developed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The G-SIBs 
have been allocated to buckets corresponding to the 
higher loss absorbency requirements they would need 
to satisfy from January 2016.
3.2 The list of G-SIBs is updated every year in 
November by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and 
the BCBS. According to the last updated list published 
in November 2013, 29 banking groups have been 
identifi ed as G-SIBs.
Increasing Size of Big Global Banks
3.3 Although fi rms and markets are beginning to 
adjust to the regulatory approach towards ending 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF), research1 based on bond credit 
spreads shows lower risk sensitivity for the largest 
fi nancial institutions indicating continued expectation 
of sovereign support to such institutions. Even as 
efforts are under way to end the implicit subsidy 
1  Warburton, A. Joseph and Anginer, Deniz and Acharya, Viral V. (2013), “The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees”, 
January 1, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961656.
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associated with the SIFIs, the biggest banks have 
grown even bigger since 2008 (Chart 3.1).
3.4 Size alone does not capture the essence of the 
problem of TBTF, (e.g. the case of government owned 
banks). The complexity, interconnectedness and 
substitutability aspects of SIFIs make the problem 
much more diffi cult. As the big banks have got bigger, 
the need for a greater degree of transparency and 
market discipline has not yet been fully addressed.
3.5 The present debate on TBTF revolves around 
the fi nal numbers for higher additional capital ratios 
for the SIFIs and their implications for credit and 
growth, with unresolved issues about the use of 
divergent accounting practices in respect of derivatives 
and differences in calculation of risk weighted assets. 
Meanwhile, at a national level, regulators seek to 
address the risks posed to domestic fi nancial systems 
by the G- SIFIs by ring-fencing local operations. There 
is also a growing concern that lobbying by the very 
large and transnational fi rms may cause delays in 
finalising and implementing effective reform 
measures to address the fundamental issues related 
to TBTF.
Framework for dealing with India’s Domestic 
Systemically Important Banks
3.6 There is no Indian bank in the list of G-SIBs. 
The BCBS and FSB have fi nalised a principles-based, 
minimum framework for addressing Domestic 
Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs).
3.7 The Reserve Bank has released the draft 
framework2 for identifying the D-SIBs and the 
regulatory / supervisory policies applicable to them. 
The assessment methodology adopted by the Reserve 
Bank is essentially based on the BCBS methodology, 
with suitable modifications to capture domestic 
importance of a bank. The indicators for identifi cation 
and assessment, proposed in the draft framework are: 
size, interconnectedness, substitutability and 
2  RBI (2013b), “Draft Framework for dealing with Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs)”,December 2 (http://rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.
aspx?Id=2766)
Chart 3.1: Trends in Total Assets of some big banks 
during the period 2008-2013
Source: The Banker database and websites of banks
complexity. D-SIBs will be required to have additional 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital requirement ranging 
from 0.20 per cent to 0.80 per cent of risk weighted 
assets. The computation of systemic importance 
scores will be carried out at yearly intervals.
Shadow Banking
Divergence in Size and Profi le
3.8 In its annual shadow banking monitoring 
exercise, the FSB uses “Other Financial Intermediaries” 
(OFIs) as a conservative proxy for the size of shadow 
banking. The OFIs include all Non- Banking Financial 
Institutions (NBFIs) except insurance companies, 
pension funds or public sector development fi nancial 
entities. While, globally, the average share of OFI 
assets is about 24 per cent of GDP, there are signifi cant 
variations in the size for individual jurisdictions 
(Chart 3.2).
3.9 For a number of emerging market economies, 
non-bank fi nancial intermediation remained relatively 
small, compared to the level of GDP. On average, the 
size of non-bank fi nancial intermediation in terms of 
assets was equivalent to 52 per cent of the banking 
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system with cross-country differences, ranging from 
below 10 per cent in some emerging economies to 
174 per cent in US at the end of 2012.
3.10 In India and certain other economies like 
Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Russia and Saudi Arabia, 
the non-bank fi nancial assets remained below 20 per 
cent of GDP at the end of 2012. However, the sector 
showed rapid growth, though from a low base, in 
some of these jurisdictions, including India. While 
the growth trends need to be monitored, the role and 
characteristics of NBFIs in most developing countries 
are different from those in advanced economies. They 
are predominantly domestic in focus with minimal 
cross-border activities/risks, support financial 
inclusion and are subject to regulatory oversight.
3.11 In the Indian context, the Non Banking Finance 
Companies (NBFCs) are regulated by the Reserve Bank 
and all types of Mutual Funds (MFs) are regulated by 
the SEBI. As such India doesn’t have shadow banking 
entities, in the formal fi nancial system, with potential 
for creating systemic instability. However, a large 
number of non-bank fi nancial entities function in the 
unorganized sector (unincorporated entities – outside 
the purview of regulatory perimeter), whose collective 
size and profi le of activities need to be gauged to 
ensure that they do not pose any threat to the ‘trust’ 
in and ‘stability’ of India’s fi nancial system.
Regulatory Arbitrage – NBFCs and Cooperative 
Societies
3.12 There is also a need to plug the regulatory gaps 
to stop fi nancial entities from changing their ‘form’ 
for the implicit purpose of avoiding regulations, as 
was seen in a recent episode involving a company 
converting itself into a cooperative society to escape 
the rules relating to its fund raising and other 
activities. There are stringent norms for granting 
Certificate of Registration for NBFCs which are 
permitted to accept public deposits. The companies 
are thereafter subject to monitoring and may be 
restricted from accepting deposits if their fi nancial 
position weakens. The Reserve Bank also prescribes 
limits on the quantum of deposits that can be 
accepted by an NBFC. The requirement of minimum 
capital and other financial parameters are more 
relaxed or non-existent in cases of cooperative 
societies. The cooperative credit societies which 
provide fi nancial accommodation to their members 
also accept deposits from members as an activity 
Chart 3.2: Size of non-bank fi nancial intermediaries
(As a percentage of GDP, by jurisdiction)
AR = Argentina; AU = Australia; BR = Brazil; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CN = China; CL = Chile; DE = Germany; ES = Spain; FR = France; HK = Hong Kong; 
ID = Indonesia; IN = India; IT = Italy; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; NL = Netherlands; RU = Russia; SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TR = Turkey; 
UK = United Kingdom; US = United States; XM = Euro area; ZA = South Africa.
1 Note that ‘banks’ refer to the broader category of ‘deposit-taking institutions’.   2 20 jurisdictions and euro area.
Sources: FSB Shadow Banking Monitoring Report –November 2013 (Based on National fl ow of funds data; other national sources; IMF)
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incidental to their core activity. The quantum of these 
deposits is not regulated as in the case of NBFCs. The 
rate of interest which can be paid on public deposits 
accepted by NBFCs is regulated by Reserve Bank. 
However the interest rate offered by cooperative 
societies is not regulated or capped by any regulation.
Money Market Mutual Funds – Interconnectedness 
with Banks
3.13 The previous FSR had mentioned that Money 
Market Mutual Funds (MMMFs) with constant Net 
Asset Value (NAV) were not permitted in India. 
However, the strong interconnectedness among banks 
and mutual funds has been a cause for concern. Debt 
mutual funds account for 70 per cent of the assets 
under management (AUM).
3.14 These mutual funds had experienced diffi cult 
liquidity conditions during the global fi nancial crisis 
and SEBI had taken various regulatory measures viz. 
restriction on investments in certain instruments, 
changes in valuation norms, provisions regarding 
uniform cut-off timings for applicability of NAV etc. 
With low levels of retail participation, the MMMFs 
continue to rely on investment by banks, corporates 
and other institutional investors.
3.15 Due to their interconnectedness with banks, 
liquidity pressure is felt by the MMMFs whenever 
redemption requirements of banks are large and 
simultaneous. The liquid debt mutual funds are large 
lenders in the over-night markets such as collateralized 
borrowing and lending obligation (CBLO) and market 
repo, where banks are large borrowers. Various 
schemes of mutual funds also invest heavily in 
certifi cates of deposit (CDs) of banks. Such circular 
fl ow of funds between banks and mutual funds is a 
source of systemic instability in times of stress/
liquidity crunch, etc. In view of these concerns, banks’ 
investments in liquid / short term debt schemes of 
mutual funds was restricted to 10 per cent of their 
net worth3, effective July 2011.
3.16 Debt mutual funds in India had seen large 
infl ows during 2012-13, from foreign institutional 
investors (FIIs) during the fi rst fi ve months of calendar 
year 2013, due to the higher returns offered. The 
depreciation of the Indian rupee in response to the 
announcement of tapering by the Fed earlier this year 
led to large scale sell off by FIIs of debt securities 
during the month of June 2013.
3.17 As a result of Reserve Bank’s measures on 
tightening of liquidity during July 2013, investments 
by banks as a percentage of total AUM of liquid/money 
market schemes declined (from 21.14 per cent on 15 
July 2013 to 13.02 per cent as on 16 July 2013, which 
further declined to 7.77 per cent as on 31 July 2013). 
With a view to pre-empt any liquidity crisis for mutual 
fund industry SEBI and RBI took measures like 
enhancement (on case to case basis) in the borrowing 
limit of mutual fund schemes and a Special Reserve 
Bank Re-Finance Window to commercial banks for 
meeting the liquidity requirements of the mutual 
funds industry. However, these facilities were not 
actually availed, showing improvement in liquidity 
management by MFs even in the face of heavy 
redemptions.
Financial Markets: Infrastructure and Development
‘Fixing’ in International Financial Markets
3.18 Recent reports of manipulation of benchmark 
reference rates and prices in international foreign 
exchange markets and spot oil markets and 
investigation by authorities in major developed 
jurisdictions have once again brought to focus 
concerns regarding the effi cacy of self-regulation in 
fi nancial markets. Some of the largest international 
banks have been penalised heavily for their role in 
the irregularities. It appears that the disproportionately 
large share in trading enjoyed by a few large players 
allows them to use the information asymmetry to 
their advantage at the cost of smaller players. The 
investigations also highlight the role of ethics in 
3  Investment by banks in liquid/short term debt schemes of mutual funds (http://rbi.org.in/scripts/Notifi cationUser.aspx?Id=6602&Mode=0)
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fi nance and the inherent limitations of regulation 
to pre-empt manipulation by market players of the 
rules on which the whole edifi ce of global fi nancial 
markets rests.
Review of Benchmarks in Indian Financial Markets
3.19 The benchmark setting process and governance 
mechanisms in case of major Indian financial 
benchmarks, mainly FIMMDA-NSE MIBOR (interest 
rate benchmark) and RBI Reference Rate (forex 
benchmark), have been observed to be robust. 
Although there have been no major instances of 
manipulation of market rates in India’s domestic 
markets, the Reserve Bank has constituted a 
committee to conduct a review of the systems and 
procedures in place with regard to major fi nancial 
benchmarks in India.
3.20 The MIBOR is calculated from the polled rates 
from a select panel of 30 banks/primary dealers, using 
bootstrapping technique and the mean corresponding 
to the lowest standard deviation is taken as the fi xing 
rate for the day. The bootstrapping method facilitates 
random drawing of multiple data sets which guards 
against the possibility of cartelisation and of extreme 
observations infl uencing the fi xing rate. The condition 
requiring a specifi ed minimum number of quotes after 
trimming mitigates the risk of loss of information due 
to excessive trimming. Moreover, the biggest 
safeguard against manipulation of overnight MIBOR 
fi xed by NSE through polling has been the existing 
system of transparent execution of more than 90 per 
cent of the inter-bank money market trades on NDS-
CALL platform and dissemination of the traded rates 
(of the trades executed on NDS-CALL as well as 
outside NDS-CALL) in the public domain.
3.21 For the forex benchmarks, the Reserve Bank 
computes and disseminates the exchange rate of the 
Indian Rupee against US Dollar and Euro on a daily 
basis. The process is reviewed periodically in view of 
the changing dynamics of the domestic foreign 
exchange market and other factors like its growing 
linkages with the offshore market. As a result of 
changes brought into effect in April 2010, the number 
of banks in the polling panel was significantly 
expanded, of which a set of banks are selected 
randomly every day for obtaining quotes. Further, the 
reference time window was expanded to 30 minutes 
(1145 IST to 1215 IST) from the earlier 15 minutes, of 
which a fi ve minute window is selected randomly 
every day for conducting polling. As bulk of USD/INR 
inter-bank spot trades are done on Reuters dealing 
platform and not on telephones, the actual traded 
rates are available almost instantly which are also 
compared with the polled rates to ensure that the 
polled rates are not signifi cantly different from the 
actual dealt rates.
Issues in Indian Fixed Income and Derivatives 
Markets
3.22 India’s domestic markets for interest rate 
derivatives, despite an existence of two decades have 
not taken off, due to the absence of some of the basic 
building blocks4. Since derivatives are priced through 
replication portfolios, two building blocks are required 
to be in place. First, reasonable asset market liquidity 
and second, a transparent funding curve against 
which the market makers in the derivatives market 
can lend or borrow. Even if the asset market liquidity 
is taken as exogenous, the absence of a funding curve 
induces pricing inefficiency in the derivatives 
segment. Even though banks generally have signifi cant 
appetite for unsecured term borrowing (as the market 
in CDs as well as borrowing through bulk deposits 
from institutional corporate participants for shorter 
tenors show), an inter-bank term lending benchmark 
has not yet developed.
3.23 Delivery based Interest Rate Futures (IRFs) 
suffer from inherent limitations owing to non-
uniform liquidity in the underlying deliverables 
affecting the price discovery of the product. However, 
as per the recent guidelines issued on December 5, 
2013, all the IRFs will now be cash settled (91days, 
2yr & 5yr and 10yr). 10yr IRF will have both cash 
settled and delivery based options.
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3.24 While some issues like narrow institutional 
ownership, low retail participation and domination 
of on the run securities have affected the liquidity in 
Government securities market, the G-Sec market 
liquidity has improved over the years and in May, the 
average daily volume had clocked the ` 1 trillion mark. 
The anonymous electronic trading platform and CCP 
based clearing for all G-Sec trades (including OTC) 
have provided a great fi llip to the market liquidity. It 
is observed that the market liquidity in the present 
Indian context is more a function of interest rate 
movements and infl ation/interest rate outlook than 
of structural factors.
3.25 As regards, development of a term money 
market, there are non-trivial operational issues that 
are required to be resolved (like benchmark based on 
secondary market CD trades or primary issuances, 
cohort of banks) prior to fi nalising the design of the 
benchmark. While multiple swap curves based on 
fl oating rate indices (currently the individual “base 
rates” of banks) are symptomatic of market ineffi ciency, 
inter-se trading between OIS and the term Interest 
Rate Swap (IRS) curves is likely to erase any 
arbitrageable differential.
3.26 While the recent initiative of Reserve Bank to 
offer term repo facility is expected to develop a term 
money market curve, introduction of money market 
futures on the lines of Euro dollar futures would 
hasten inter-se convergence between curves but 
introduction of the money market futures should 
ideally follow establishment of term benchmarks and 
not the other way round. The liquidity in interest rate 
derivatives segment as well as government securities 
segment is likely to be positively affected if non-bank 
participants enter the fray. Such participants are 
relatively immune to accounting methodology 
applicable to banks and hence can winnow out 
arbitrage opportunities. 
Liquidity Management in Banks
3.27 The Indian banking system has been persistently 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank window starting 
mid-2010 (Chart 3.3), suggesting that banks have 
become dependent on central bank support in 
meeting their structural funding defi cits. Prior to mid-
2010 banks borrowed only occasionally from the 
Reserve Bank despite high credit growth (Chart 3.4). 
4  Indranil Chakraborty and R Ayyappan Nair, “Imperfections in Indian fi xed-income derivative markets - Plausible rationale”, Unpublished RBI Working Paper
Chart 3.4: Non-food Credit Growth
Source: RBI
Chart 3.3: RBI Liquidity Injections and Money Market Volumes
Data: Updated till December 12, 2013
Source: RBI and CCIL
 Chapter III Financial Sector Regulation and Infrastructure
52
In addition, RBI’s holding of GoI securities have also 
been increasing (Chart 3.5). During the period covered 
(2004-2013) volumes in overnight unsecured 
interbank market (call money market) remained 
broadly unchanged indicating constraints for the 
overnight unsecured interbank market (an important 
bench mark market, otherwise) to grow.
Move for Reorientation of India Banking System
3.28 In recognition of the need for reviewing the 
existing structure of Indian banking system, in terms 
of its size, capacity, ability to meet divergent needs 
for credit and banking services, access and 
inclusiveness; the Reserve Bank has initiated a 
discussion5 on various aspects of intended 
reorientation of the banking system. The identifi ed 
building blocks for the revised banking structure in 
India seek to address issues such as enhancing 
competition, financing higher growth, providing 
specialized services, and furthering financial 
inclusion. The discussion paper also seeks to 
emphasize the need to address the fi nancial stability 
concerns arising out of the suggested changes in 
banking structure.
Risk Based Supervision (RBS) for Banks
3.29 Based on the recommendations of the High 
Level Steering Committee (HLSC), Reserve Bank has 
fi nalised a supervisory framework named as SPARC 
(Supervisory Programme for Assessment of Risk and 
Capital) under RBS. As part of RBS phase I rollout, 29 
banks have been brought under the framework from 
the fi nancial year 2013.
3.30 The revised framework underscores a 
comprehensive evaluation of both present and future 
risks, identifi cation of incipient issues, determination 
of a supervisory stance based on the evaluation and 
facilitating timely intervention and corrective action. 
5  RBI (2013a), “Discussion Paper on ‘Banking Structure in India – Way Forward”, September 23 (http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.
aspx?prid=29614)
6  CAMELS (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, Systems & Controls) approach for domestic banks; CALCS (Capital Adequacy, 
Asset Quality, Liquidity, Compliance, Systems & Controls) approach for foreign banks
Chart 3.5: RBI’s Holdings of Central Government Securities
Source: RBI
This would mark a considerable shift from the present 
CAMELS/ CALCS6 methodology, which is a more 
compliance-based and transaction testing (point-in-
time) oriented. The revised supervisory strategy 
under RBS would be more off-site oriented combined 
with need based, risk based, focused on site 
inspections.
Central Repository of Large Common Exposures of 
Banks
3.31 Information asymmetry is a fundamental 
challenge which affects the debtor-creditor 
relationship. Debtors are more informed about their 
fi nancial standing than the creditors who evaluate 
whether to extend credit to the debtors. In this 
context, the Reserve Bank initiated a proposal of 
creating a central repository of large credits to track 
large common exposures across banks. The database 
is proposed to be shared with the banks to enable 
banks themselves to be aware of leverage and 
common exposures. Accordingly directives were 
issued to banks on September 11, 2013 under Section 
27(2) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 to 
operationalise the credit repository of large exposures.
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3.32 The information supplied by the banks on their 
funded and non-funded exposures to large individual/
corporate borrowers (i.e., the borrowers with credit 
limit of `100 million and above from the banking 
system) is proposed be used to create the credit 
registry. The uniqueness of the borrowers is proposed 
to be captured through the Permanent Account 
Number (PAN) reported by the banks which will be 
cross verifi ed from the Income Tax Authority to the 
extent possible. Borrowers, not having a PAN, will be 
allotted unique identifi cation number only for the 
purpose of reporting in the return. Other information 
to be captured as part of the credit registry include 
name of the borrower, industry, sector, rating details, 
facility wise funded and non- funded exposures, 
limits, etc. An online query module is being offered 
to the banks, through which they can view any 
individual large borrower’s asset classifi cation- wise 
total funded and non- funded exposures to the 
banking system. The information on large common 
exposures will be shared with banks only on an 
aggregate basis without disclosing the names of the 
banks with which the borrowers have banking 
relationship.
Centralised Database for Corporate Bonds/
Debentures
3.33 Similarly, for the corporate securities markets, 
while the information in respect of bonds/debentures 
issued by various issuers is available in a fragmented 
manner, need was felt for a comprehensive database 
on corporate bonds. SEBI has initiated action for 
setting up of ‘Centralised Database for Corporate 
Bonds/Debentures’ by mandating both the depositories 
viz. NSDL and CDSL to jointly create, host, maintain 
and disseminate the centralized database of corporate 
bonds/debentures .  The  depos i tor ies  wi l l 
obtain requisite information regarding the bonds/
debentures from Issuers, Stock Exchanges, Credit 
Rating Agencies and Debenture Trustees. All the 
intermediaries will be required to update the database 
on ongoing basis, which can be accessed by the public 
free of charges.
Insurance Repository System
3.34 In India risk is not just covered by an individual’s 
contributions to insurance but also by contributions 
from employers, banks and cooperative societies, for 
instance, on behalf of their employees, customers and 
members, respectively. It becomes diffi cult for an 
insured individual (and for the dependents / 
benefi ciaries) to track and list these insurance policies 
and secure them at a safe and easily retrievable place. 
Even with the use of technology, visiting multiples 
offi ces of the insurance companies or logging requests/
making premium payments through multiple portals 
of the insurance companies have been posing 
diffi culties to the policyholders.
3.35 The Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) had conceived an initiative to de-
materialise the Insurance policies and enable 
electronic issuance and maintenance of the insurance 
policies. IRDA has authorised fi ve entities to act as 
‘Insurance Repositories’, to enable storage and 
retrieval of electronic policies. These repositories are 
otherwise unrelated to Insurance companies and are 
empowered to meet certain policy servicing 
requirement. The initiative would enable electronic 
issuance of insurance policies and it is also possible 
to convert previously held insurance policies into 
electronic form through an electronic insurance 
account (eIA).
3.36 The eIA is offered free of cost to the policyholder 
and will hold the insurance policies in an electronic 
form and provides safe custody of insurance policies 
issued by various Insurance companies. Majority of 
the service requests can be placed with the Insurance 
Repositories who will facilitate the delivery of the 
service by the Insurance companies. The policyholder 
is relieved from the trouble of visiting offi ces of 
multiple insurance companies for  the purpose of 
requests like change of address/nomination etc. The 
model allows appointment of ‘Approved persons’ who 
are easily approachable and accessible even to the 
rural policyholders. The eIA holder can appoint an 
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‘Authorised representative’ who can operate the 
account in case of death or disability of the policyholder 
to facilitate the nominees/assignees in claiming the 
benefi ts under the insurance policies. The Insurance 
Repositories provide a periodic statement to the 
policyholder with the status of all the insurance 
policies held under an eIA.
3.37 The initiative of ‘Insurance Repositories’ 
currently is launched on a pilot basis for life insurance 
and will soon extend to other lines of business 
including Annuities, Group and General Insurance 
policies. Owing to the scale, the Insurance Repositories 
promise to bring down the cost of policy servicing 
thus enabling the Insurance companies to achieve 
effi ciencies that possibly reduce the premiums and 
the turnaround times in delivering services.
Progress on LEI System for India
3.38 As reported in the previous FSR, the Reserve 
Bank had joined the Regulatory Oversight Committee 
of the global Legal Entity Identifi er (LEI) system in 
January 2013, recognising its importance for the 
Indian fi nancial system.
3.39 A Steer ing  Committee  consist ing  of 
representatives from the Reserve Bank, Ministries of 
Finance and Company Affairs, SEBI and IRDA has been 
set up to guide the process of implementation of the 
LEI in India. 
Regulation and Consumer Protection
Regulatory Gaps – Electronic Spot Markets in 
Commodities
3.40 The recent payment and settlement crisis at 
the National Spot Exchange limited (NSEL) highlighted, 
among other things, a gap in the regulation of the 
commodity spot exchanges in India. Initiatives to 
launch commodity spot exchanges in India are of 
relatively recent origin. Setting up of such exchanges 
was facilitated in the mid-2000s in response to a felt 
need that a sustained and healthy development of 
futures market was contingent upon the simultaneous 
development of the physical or spot market for 
commodities. In order to provide adequate liquidity 
on the trading platforms, Government of India 
permitted the electronic spot exchanges a facility of 
offsetting (cash settlement) the contracts on the day 
of entering into contracts, but it also mandated that 
if the contracts were not offset (cash settled) on the 
same day, they would have to compulsorily result in 
delivery of goods. The one-day forward contracts 
traded on spot exchanges were exempted from the 
provision of the FCRA, with stiff conditions including 
a ban on short selling and the launch of longer term 
contracts.
3.41 Detailed investigations into the various 
malpractices at NSEL have revealed the need for 
comprehensively addressing the problems in 
commodity spot markets in India. The FMC has been 
brought under the ambit of the Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India, to ensure better co-ordination 
among various fi nancial sector regulators.
3.42 The fallout of the events in the NSEL on other 
exchanges / markets was limited. However, the 
episode revealed certain systemic concerns with 
regard to ownership and governance arrangements in 
exchanges and common ownership of exchanges and 
existing technology platforms. The episode has 
emphasized the need for ensuring that no single 
shareholder or a group of shareholders is permitted 
to dominate the functioning of the exchange or 
exercise management control.
Frauds and Customer Complaints in Banking System
3.43 While number of fraud cases have shown a 
decreasing trend from 2009-10 to 2012-13, the total 
amount involved in cases of frauds has increased 
substantially over this period (Chart 3.6).
3.44  It is observed that the number of cases of large 
value frauds (involving amount of `500 Million and 
above) has increased signifi cantly over the last 3 years- 
from 3 cases in FY 2009-10 to 45 cases during 2012-13, 
with an even more alarming increase in terms of total 
55
Financial Stability Report December 2013  
amount involved in such cases. The rise in incidences 
of frauds in large value loan accounts, is a concern 
and concerted action to improve checks and balances 
and deterrent action will be required to tackle the 
problem.
3.45 Online frauds, lottery SMS alerts, advertisements 
inducing customers to share the details of bank 
accounts, cloning of cards etc. pose a real challenge 
for the banks and customers alike in matters of safety 
and security. Banks need to evolve a comprehensive 
policy with regard to online banking services, by 
focusing on compensation, insurance and / or a 
limited liability clause.
3.46 The Reserve Bank has taken certain measures 
like introducing compensation for delay in payments 
of pension. Some other recommendations of the 
Committee on Customer Service in Banks with regard 
to payment of pension have also been implemented. 
The customer complaints redressal system at banks 
needs strengthening considering their link with 
operational risk.
Rising Trend in Mis-selling in Insurance products
3.47 The previous FSR had raised the risks from 
mis-selling of insurance products. The complaints 
under mis-selling have registered a rising trend in 
recent years (Table 3.1). While mis-selling is not 
defi ned in the any of the legislations or regulations 
governing insurance business, it broadly refers to 
unfair or fraudulent practices adopted at the time of 
soliciting and selling insurance policies which have 
not been sought by the customer or where the 
customers feel that the policies sold are different from 
what they wanted or what they were promised. 
Increasing number of complaints of mis-selling may 
affect the confi dence of general public in insurance 
products, intermediaries and insurance companies.
3.48 Complaints of mis-selling could impact the 
continuation of policies affecting the cash fl ows of 
insurance companies. More importantly, it seriously 
affects the demand for insurance which could have 
Chart 3.6: Trends in Cases of Frauds 
(Number and Amount)
Table 3.1: Trends in Complaints of Mis-selling
Particulars 2013-14
(up to 
Sep 30, 
2013)
2012-13 2011-12
Complaints on unfair business practices 109419 157688 91298
Total complaints 185769 322810 295196
Per cent of total complaints 58.90 48.85 30.93
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serious implications on insurance as an avenue of 
tapping savings for long term investments for the 
economy.
Regulatory Measures to Check Mis-selling of 
Insurance Products
3.49 The IRDA (Protection of Policyholders Interests’) 
Regulation, 2002 provides the framework for 
protection from mis-selling through the requirements 
to be met at point of sale, proposal, sale and servicing 
of insurance products emphasizing on complete 
disclosures. There is an option of ‘free look 
cancellation’ within 15 days of receiving the policy 
document. Misleading publications for soliciting or 
selling of policies are prohibited under the IRDA 
(Insurance Advertisements and Disclosure 
Regulations), 2000. Regulations for licensing of 
insurance intermediaries like agents, corporate agents 
and brokers and prescribed code of conduct for their 
operations are aimed at ensuring that intermediaries 
do not resort to unfair practices. Guidelines on 
distance marketing by insurers and intermediaries 
provide for protection of prospects even if the 
solicitation or sale is not made in person but through 
alternate channels like phone, email or internet. 
Regulations relating to standard proposal form are 
aimed at better underwriting before sale of policies 
by analyzing the need of prospect before sale of 
policies. The improvements in products and 
disclosures, especially in unit linked policies, are also 
aimed at providing customers with full information 
to enable them to make an informed choice.
3.50 IRDA has the power to take regulatory action 
against insurers and intermediaries which include 
imposition of fi ne, issuance of warning, suspension 
of license and cancellation of license and IRDA has 
been increasingly using these powers to check mis-
selling. Apart from the regulatory framework and 
powers, the mechanisms for supervision, corporate 
governance, grievance redressal and consumer 
education are also aligned to check the unfair business 
practices like mis-selling.
Trends in Pledging of Shares by Promoters
3.51 The pledging of shares by promoters of Indian 
companies has been an old practice, but earlier the 
information was not made publicly available. In 2009, 
SEBI had mandated event based disclosures, which 
must be made as and when the shares are pledged 
and periodic disclosures along with quarterly fi lings 
with stock exchanges.
3.52 Pledging of shares by promoters is perceived as 
a signifi cant activity with many implications for risks 
to the markets, especially when the funding markets 
face tight conditions. Usually, a high percentage of 
promoter shareholding is seen as positive since it 
indicates the faith of the promoters in the business 
and any dilution in the stake of promoters is perceived 
as diminishing confi dence of promoters. It has been 
observed that the equity prices of the companies in 
which the promoters had pledged signifi cant portions 
of their shares, tend to fall faster than the broader 
correction in the market. The shares of such 
companies might have been infl uenced, apart from 
other factors, by the risks related to the perceived 
diffi culty in meeting the margin calls triggered by the 
decrease in the market price of shares.
3.53 Pledging of shares by promoters could pose as 
a concern in both, falling or rising market scenarios, 
when large scale pledging of promoter equity could 
pose concerns for retail investors’ wealth. In a falling 
market, pledged shares would be under pressure as 
diminished share prices can turn the collaterals 
cheaper, prompting lenders to either demand 
additional margins or sell shares in the open market 
to protect their interests. Either action could have a 
cascading impact on stock price, thereby eroding 
investor’s wealth. The said risk is less in a rising 
market. In a rising market, the concerns arising out 
of a downside in collateral value are lesser. However, 
pledging has a destabilising effect on shareholding 
pattern. Also, promoters who pledge shares in a rising 
market could be at a high risk when a bearish trend 
sets in.
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3.54 In an analysis carried out by SEBI, based on 
Capitaline database, it was observed that in case of 
4274 listed companies7, promoters had pledged some 
or all their shares in those companies. It was seen 
that out of these, in the case of 286 companies the 
promoters had pledged more than 50 per cent of their 
share holding. These 286 companies are grouped into 
high, medium and low risk categories, based on 
number of shares pledged by promoters in proportion 
to the total outstanding shares of the company 
(Table 3.2).
3.55 The analysis of 202 companies (which were 
considered as high risk and medium risk companies 
from the short listed set of 286 companies), after 
categorising them according to their market 
capitalisation levels shows that 91 per cent of the 
high risk and medium risk companies i.e. 183 
companies fall under the small cap category and 
remaining 9 per cent of the high risk and medium 
risk companies (Table 3.3). Thus a small number of 
companies under the large cap and mid cap category 
need to be considered as potential cases for 
initiating further examination of the trends in 
pledging of shares by promoters and implications 
for the wider market.
Financial Stability and Development Council
3.56 The Financial Stability and Development 
Council (FSDC) and its Sub Committee deliberated on 
various aspects that impinge on fi nancial stability - 
macroeconomic scenario, both global and domestic 
and the developments in fi nancial markets. After the 
publication of the last FSR, the FSDC met once while 
two meetings of FSDC Sub Committee were held 
during this period. Some of the other important items 
taken up for discussion at the FSDC and its Sub 
Committee include: increased volatility in FX markets 
and the fi nancing of the current account defi cit in the 
face of sudden reversal of capital fl ows; the risks to 
the banking sector on account of deteriorating asset 
7  Companies which fi le the share holding pattern details fi led by the with the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)/ National Stock Exchange (NSE)
Table 3.2: Distribution of Companies against Proportion 
of Pledged Shares (Size-wise)
Shares pledged 
by promoter 
group as a % of 
Total shares of 
the company
Category 
of Risk
Companies 
where share 
pledged 
> 75% of 
Promoters’ 
holdings
Companies 
where share 
pledged 
between 
50% -75% of 
Promoters’ 
holdings
Total 
Companies
In 
Nos.
In % In 
Nos.
In % In Nos.
Above 50% High 39 25 9 7 48
Between 25% 
to 50%
Medium 81 53 73 55 154
Less than 25% Low 34 22 50 38 84
Total 154 100 132 100 286
Table 3.3: Distribution of Companies against Proportion of 
Pledged Shares (Risk-wise)
Categorisation of 
companies based on 
market capitalisaton
High Risk 
Companies
Medium 
Risk 
Companies
Total 
Companies
In 
Nos.
In % In 
Nos.
In % In 
Nos.
In %
Large Cap 
(Above `100 billion)
1 2 1 1 2 1
Mid Cap (Between `20 
billion and `100 billion)
6 13 11 7 17 8
Small Cap (< `20 billion) 41 85 142 92 183 91
Total 48 100 154 100 202 100
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quality; the extra-territorial aspects of regulations by 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
and US Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC); trends in bancassurance business with 
specifi c reference to single premium policies, etc. In 
addition, the Sub Committee reviewed issues relating 
to inter regulatory co-ordination viz., a proposal to 
facilitate settlement of equity market transactions in 
central bank money (pursuant to an FSAP 
recommendation), permitting banks to act as brokers 
for insurance companies, etc.
National Strategy for Financial Education
3.57 The implementation of National Strategy for 
Financial Education (NSFE) which was prepared under 
the aegis of the Sub Committee (and was covered in 
detail in the December 2012 FSR) has commenced. A 
website for the National Centre for Financial 
Education8 (which acts as the nodal agency for 
implementation of NSFE and is supported by all the 
financial sector regulators) has been launched. 
Financial inclusion and literacy efforts were further 
strengthened with initiatives like fi nancial inclusion 
plans for various segments of the fi nancial sector on 
the lines of those for banks; nation-wide fi nancial 
literacy survey; national fi nancial literacy assessment 
test for students of classes VIII to X; and fi nancial 
literacy curriculum for schools.
Technology and Financial Markets
Securing fi nancial transactions in India
3.58 Cyber attacks are being seen as a potentially 
high risk area with increasing use of Internet Banking, 
and Mobile Banking for financial transactions 
(Box 3.1). In view of rising incidents of cyber attacks 
and implications for fi nancial stability as a whole, 
there is need for banks to take up protective and 
proactive measures. Information security awareness 
8  www.ncfeindia.org
9  “Reducing Systemic Cyber-security Risk”:  OECD/IFP Project on “Future Global Shocks” By Peter Sommer, Information Systems and Innovation Group, 
London School of Economics Ian Brown, Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University
10  Cyber-crime, securities markets and systemic risk: Joint Staff Working Paper of the IOSCO, Research Department and World Federation of Exchanges, 
Author: Rohini Tendulkar (IOSCO Research Department) Survey: Grégoire Naacke (World Federation of Exchanges Offi ce) and Rohini Tendulkar
world’s exchanges, from the perspective of securities 
market.
Cyber-crimes can be understood as an attack on the 
confi dentiality, integrity and accessibility of an entity’s 
online/computer presence or networks – and information 
contained within. The catastrophic single cyber-related 
events could include successful attack on one of the 
underlying technical protocols upon which the Internet 
depends and a very large-scale solar fl are which physically 
destroys key communications components such as 
satellites, cellular base stations and switches. The risks 
from other types of breaches of cyber security such as 
malware, distributed denial of service, espionage, and 
the actions of criminals and hackers are expected to be 
Box 3.1: Cyber Security and Cyber Crimes: International Approach
The risks of security of the internet and integrity of 
information and processes in the cyber world have 
become critical in ensuring a smooth functioning of 
fi nancial systems, as for other aspects of economic, social 
and political life. Although, as concluded by some reports9, 
very few isolated cyber-related events have the capacity 
to cause a global crisis, there is a need to make detailed 
assessments of risks and preparations to withstand and 
recover from a wide range of unwanted cyber events, both 
accidental and deliberate. The Research Department of 
the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO), jointly with the World Federation of Exchanges 
Offi ce, has conducted a cyber-crime survey10 to bring 
attention towards the threats from cyber-crimes to some 
of the most critical fi nancial market infrastructures - the (Contd...)
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among various stakeholders is critical for the banks 
to secure their information and information 
infrastructure.
3.59 Securing electronic transactions through the 
medium of cards is necessary to ensure confi dence 
and faith in such payments. The Reserve Bank has 
issued directions to the banks to ensure security of 
such transactions by mandating an additional factor 
of authentication for all Card not present transactions 
(Ecommerce/IVR/Mail Order Telephone Order 
(MOTO)) and Card present (ATM & POS). The Reserve 
Bank has also advised the banks to move to EMV Chip 
& PIN technology for customers who have used their 
cards at international locations and for issuance of 
new cards wherein the customer has demanded a card 
for international usage. Directions have also been 
given to banks to secure the internet banking 
transactions and also to provide online alerts to the 
customers irrespective of the value of transaction for 
usage of cards at any delivery channel.
Cyber Security of India’s FMIs under SEBI
3.60 In the previous FSR it was mentioned that 
systems and processes instituted at the FMIs have 
stood them in good stead in the past. However, given 
the dynamic nature and novelty in data thefts and 
frauds, FMIs need to constantly upgrade and review 
their processes and systems to prevent any data theft 
or security failure. Pursuant to IOSCO Report, the 
FMIs have reported that they broadly carried out 
necessary upgradation of their systems and processes.
3.61 In light of the fi ndings of the survey report on 
“Cyber-Crime, Systemic Risk and Global Securities 
Markets”, SEBI registered FMIs (exchanges and 
depositories) acted proactively and already built in 
reactive and proactive defences along with detection 
control and disaster recovery to strengthen cyber 
security in their systems.
Payment and Settlement Systems
3.62 The payment and sett lement system 
infrastructure in the country continued to perform 
without any major disruptions. There were no 
noteworthy exceptions observed during the Business 
Continuity Plan / Disaster Recovery (BCP/DR) Drills 
carried out in July 2013, which covered live operations 
of Payment and Settlement Systems applications i.e. 
both relatively localised and short-term in impact. The 
cyber attacks by ‘attack vectors’ which are not refl ected 
in available preventative and detective technologies, with 
the ability to produce new attack, pose the biggest 
challenge in this regard.
Although, computer systems which are stand-alone or 
communicate only over proprietary networks are safe 
from malware, they are still vulnerable to management 
carelessness and insider threats.
In case of cyber space, the defence has to concentrate on 
resilience – preventive measures plus detailed contingency 
plans to enable rapid recovery when an attack succeeds 
as it is often very difficult to identify the actual 
perpetrator because the computers from which the attack 
appears to originate will themselves have been taken over 
and used to relay and magnify the attack commands.
It is important to carry out a detailed threat assessment 
of any specifi c potential cyber threat based on possible 
triggering events, likelihood of occurrence, ease of 
implementation, immediate impact, likely duration, 
recovery factors etc. As large sections of critical national 
infrastructure may not be under full and direct 
government control, there is a need for a clear policy for 
overall public security and safety from cyber crimes.
Apart from the need for action by the government towards 
having a comprehensive policy framework for national 
cyber security, spreading awareness, developing forensic 
resources and research and international cooperation; 
the respective fi nancial sector regulators and standard 
setting bodies also need to design, update and implement 
regulations and standards for security of operations from 
cyber crimes / attacks, with special emphasis on 
promoting information sharing.
(...Concld.)
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Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) and Core 
Banking Solution (CBS) drill. No signifi cant downtime 
was experienced in the major payment and settlement 
systems over the last six months, as observed from 
the DR drills and Vulnerability Assessment and 
Penetration Testing (VAPT) conducted by 47 Public 
and Private sector banks for two quarters (April-June 
2013 and July-September 2013).
Trends in Real Time Gross Settlement System 
(RTGS)
3.63 The RTGS system was implemented in March 
2004 in the country. The new RTGS system with 
advanced features was operationalised from October 
19, 2013. The new RTGS system uses extensible mark-
up language (XML) based messaging system 
conforming to ISO 20022 standards. A new feature 
which has been made operational from the day the 
system went live is the ‘automated gridlock resolution 
mechanism’. The new RTGS has incorporated some 
other features with potential for significant 
improvements in the stability of the system as well 
as effi ciency.
Status of compliance with PFMIs
3.64 As part of the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS) and FSB, the Reserve Bank 
is committed to implement the CPSS-IOSCO 
“Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure” 
(PFMIs). A policy document on Regulation and 
Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures has 
been released by Reserve Bank on July 26, 201311. The 
policy describes in detail the criteria for designating 
an FMI, applicability of PFMIs to the FMIs, oversight 
of FMIs, list of FMIs regulated by Reserve Bank and 
other related aspects.
3.65 An Inter-Agency Implementation Group (IAIG) 
comprising members from RBI, SEBI, and Forward 
Markets commission (FMC) has been constituted, on 
the direction of the FSDC Sub-Committee, for 
monitoring the implementation of Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) in India. The 
Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) has been 
identifi ed as an important FMI, under the regulation 
of the Reserve Bank. Accordingly, the inspection CCIL 
has been carried out. SEBI has also carried out the 
assessment of fi ve FMIs under its regulations. The 
assessment of FMIs done by the respective regulators 
is  being reviewed by the members of the 
implementation group and the fi nal report will be 
submitted to the FSDC Sub-Committee.
Mobile Banking
3.66 A bank led model for mobile banking has been 
adopted In India, with only banks which are licensed 
and supervised in India and having a physical 
presence in India being permitted to offer mobile 
banking, with approval from the Reserve Bank. As on 
date, 78 banks including a few Regional Rural banks 
(RRBs), Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs) have been 
given permission for providing mobile banking 
services in the country. Helped by the rapid spread 
of use of mobile telephony, the growth in mobile 
banking has been encouraging over last three years 
(Chart 3.7).
11  http://rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx?Id=2705
Chart 3.7: Trends in Mobile Banking Transactions
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3.67 The mobile banking channel has the potential 
to be one of the key tools for achieving fi nancial 
inclusion. However, the growth and acceptance of 
mobile banking as a channel of accessing banking 
service has been below expectation. Apart from the 
low levels of awareness and acceptance, the challenges 
in a faster growth can be attributed to the factors like 
inability of banks to seed the mobile number with 
the account number, compatibility of handsets with 
the mobile banking application, absence of 
collaboration and revenue sharing models between 
banks and mobile network operators (MNOs) and 
inability to get the USD channel in operation for 
mobile banking etc.
Deposit Insurance
Single Customer View
3.68 DICGC extends deposit insurance cover to 
insured banks according to the provisions contained 
in the DICGC Act, 1961. In the absence of a 
comprehensive framework for resolution, DICGC is 
handicapped by inadequate information sharing 
regarding depositors, thus leading to delay in making 
payments to the depositors. At the international level, 
to expedite the claim settlements, a number of 
countries such as the UK, Canada and Malaysia have 
mandated banks to capture data on depositor balances 
in Single Customer View (SCV) format. In case of 
banks, a Single Customer View is an aggregated, 
consistent and holistic representation of the data 
about the depositors. It provides the deposit insurer 
a consolidated view of all deposit accounts eligible 
for deposit insurance coverage, enabling it to manage 
faster, accurate and effi cient claim settlement within 
minimum time period. SCV is heavily dependent on 
use of technology and in India, presentation of 
depositor data as required by DICGC poses various 
challenges.
Differential Premium System
3.69 Deposit insurance being a part of safety net 
mechanism plays a crucial role in maintaining 
financial stability. A system that differentiates 
premium on the basis of risk profi les of banks have 
been increasingly adopted worldwide by various 
countries as it would enable a deposit insurer perform 
its role more effectively. Its main objectives are to 
provide incentives for banks to avoid excessive risk 
taking and introduce more fairness into the premium 
assessment process. In Indian context, in order to 
have a differential premium system based on risk 
profi les of banks, there is a need to have the risk based 
ratings of the insured banks. The base for differential 
premium system may be a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative criteria. The system of 
arriving at the ratings for the banks for this purpose 
will have to be suitably devised keeping in view the 
objectives of risk based premium system.
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Systemic Risk Survey
The Systemic Risk Survey (SRS) was introduced by the Reserve Bank of India in October 2011 to capture the views 
of market participants and other stakeholders on the aggregate risks facing the fi nancial system. The present 
survey of October 2013 is the fi fth in the series.
Perceptions of market experts have not changed signifi cantly since the previous survey conducted in April 2013. 
Global and domestic macro-economic risks are perceived as the major risks threatening the fi nancial system. 
However, the intensity of the global risks within the major risk groups remained unchanged. Market risks and 
Institutional risks were perceived to have medium impact in these surveys (Figure 1).
The current survey indicates that among the global risks, risk on account of global slowdown has receded slightly 
and sovereign risks have moved to medium risk from high risk category as perceived in the previous survey, while 
global funding risks have scaled up from medium to high risk category. On the domestic macro-economic front, 
deterioration in domestic economic outlook is considered to be most critical, up from medium risk category in 
previous survey to high risk. Risk from domestic infl ation, corporate leverage and household savings have also 
increased marginally. On the other hand, risks arising from CAD, fi scal, sovereign downgrade and infrastructure 
were perceived to have receded in the current survey.  The foreign exchange risk, asset quality deterioration and 
additional capital requirements of banks have also been mentioned as other risks (Figure 2). The perception about 
confi dence in the Indian fi nancial system has deteriorated during the past six months (Chart 1). 
On likely changes about credit off-take in next three months, respondents felt that credit demand is likely to 
remain unchanged or may increase marginally. Regarding credit quality, majority of respondents felt that it is 
likely to deteriorate in the near future (Chart 2).
Figure 1: Major Risk Groups identifi ed in Systemic Risk Surveys – October 2013
Major Risk Groups Oct-13 Change Apr-13 Change Oct-12 Change Apr-12 Change Oct-11
A. Global Risks    
B. Macro-economic Risks    
C. Market Risks    
D. Institutional Risks    
E. General Risks    
Note:
Risk Category
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Change in risk since last survey
  
Increased Same Decreased
The risk perception, as emanates from the systemic risk survey conducted at different time points (on half yearly basis in April and October), may 
shift (increase/ decrease) from one category to the other, which is refl ected by change in colour. However, within the same risk category (i.e. the 
boxes with same colour), the risk perception may also increase/ decrease or remain the same, which have been shown by the arrows. The shift in 
risk perception is between to consecutive surveys.
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Surveys –  October 2011 to October 2013 (Half yearly)
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Note:
Risk Category
Very high High Medium Low Very low
Change in risk since last survey
  
Increased Same Decreased
The risk perception, as emanates from the systemic risk survey conducted at two time points, may shift (increase/ decrease) from one category to 
the other, which is refl ected by change in colour. However, within the same risk category (i.e. the boxes with same colour), the risk perception may 
also increase/ decrease or remain the same, which have been shown by the arrows.
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Surveys – April 2013 and October  2013
Figure  2 : Various Risks identifi ed in Systemic Risk Survey – October 2013
Risk Item Oct-13 Changes Apr-13
A
. G
lo
ba
l R
is
ks
Global slow down 
Sovereign Risk / Contagion 
Funding Risk  (External Borrowings) 
Global Infl ation / Commodity Price Risk (including crude oil prices) 
Other Global Risks 
B.
 M
ac
ro
-e
co
no
m
ic
 R
is
ks
Deterioration in domestic economic outlook 
Domestic Infl ation 
Current Account Defi cit 
Capital infl ows/ outfl ows (Reversal of FIIs, Slow down in FDI) 
Sovereign rating downgrade 
Fiscal Risk (High Fiscal defi cit) 
Corporate Sector Risk (High Leverage/ Low Profi tability) 
Lack / Slow pace of  Infrastructure development 
Real Estate Prices 
Household savings 
Political Risk 
Other Macroeconomic Risks 
C
. M
ar
ke
t 
Ri
sk
s
Foreign Exchange Rate Risk 
Equity Price Volatility 
Funding Risk / Liquidity Risk/ Interest Rate Risk  
Other Market Risks 
D
. I
ns
ti
tu
ti
on
al
 R
is
ks
Regulatory Risk 
Asset quality deterioration 
Additional capital requirements of banks 
Funding diffi culties of banks 
Low credit off-take 
Excessive credit growth 
Operational Risk 
Other Institutional Risks 
E.
 G
en
er
al
 
Ri
sk
s
Terrorism 
Natural disaster 
Social unrest (Increasing inequality) 
Other General Risks 
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Note: A:  High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
 B: High impact event occurring in the global fi nancial system in the period ahead  (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
 C: High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period ahead (In Short Term : upto 1 year)
 D: High impact event occurring in the Indian fi nancial system in the period ahead  (In Medium Term : 1 to 3 years)
 E: Confi dence in the stability of the global fi nancial system as a whole
 F: Confi dence in the stability of the Indian fi nancial system
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Surveys – April 2013 and October 2013
Source: RBI, Systemic Risk Survey – October 2013
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Annex-2
Methodologies
Macroeconomic Stability Map
The Macroeconomic Stability Map is based on seven sub-indices, each pertaining to a specifi c area of macroeconomic 
risk. Each sub-index on macroeconomic risk includes select parameters representing risks in that particular fi eld. 
These sub-indices have been selected based on their impact on macroeconomic or fi nancial variable such as GDP, 
infl ation, interest rates or asset quality of banks. The seven sub-indices of the overall macroeconomic stability 
index and their components are briefl y described below:
Global Index: The global index is based on output growth of the world economy. A fall in output growth affects 
overall sentiments for the domestic economy in general and has implications on demand for domestic exports, 
in particular. Capital fl ows to the domestic economy are also affected by growth at the global level. Therefore, a 
fall in output growth is associated with increased risks.
Domestic Growth: The domestic growth index is based on growth of gross domestic product. A fall in growth, 
usually, creates headwinds for banks’ asset quality, capital fl ows and over-all macroeconomic stability. Hence, a 
fall in growth is associated with increased risks.
Infl ation: Wholesale Price Index based infl ation is used to arrive at the Infl ation Index. Increase in infl ation 
reduces purchasing power of individuals and complicates investment decision of corporates. Therefore, an 
increase in infl ation is associated with higher risks.
External Vulnerability Index: The current account defi cit (CAD) to GDP ratio, reserves cover of imports and ratio 
of short term debt to total debt are included in the External Vulnerability Index. Rising CAD and ratio of short 
term debt to total debt and falling reserves cover of imports depict rising vulnerability.
Fiscal Index: The Fiscal Index is based on fi scal defi cit and primary defi cit. Higher defi cits are associated 
with higher risk. High government defi cit, in general, reduces the resources available to the private sector for 
investment and also has implications for infl ation.
Corporate Index: The health of the corporate sector is captured through profi t margin [EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) to sales] and the interest coverage ratio [EBIT (earnings before 
interest, tax) to interest payments]. Lower profi t margin and lower interest coverage ratio are associated with 
higher risks.
Household Index: This index is based on retail non-performing assets, an increase in retail NPAs is associated 
with higher risk. 
Corporate sector Stability Indicator and Map
The Corporate sector Stability Indicator and Map have been constructed using the following method:
Data: The balance sheet data of non-government non-fi nancial public limited companies.
Frequency: Annual (1992-93 to 2013-14). For 2012-13 and 2013-14, the half-yearly balance sheet data is used for 
the analysis.
Following ratios have been used for the analysis (considering 5 dimensions):
a. Profi tability : RoA(Gross Profi t/Total Assets) #, Operating Profi t/Sales #, Profi t After Tax/Sales #;
b. Leverage : Debt/ Assets, Debt/ Equity; (Debt is taken as Total Borrowings)
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c. Sustainability : Interest Coverage Ratio (EBIT to interest expenses) #, interest expenses/total expenditure;
d. Liquidity : Quick Assets/ Current Liabilities (quick ratio) #;
e. Turn-Over : Total Sales / Total Assets #. 
# Negatively related to risk.
First, the ratios were converted into standard normal variate [ ]. Then, z’s were bounded between 0 and 
1 using relative distance transformation [ ]. For (#) negatively related ratios (to risk), one’s 
complement was used. For each dimension a composite index was derived as a simple average of relevant d’s 
(principal component analysis also gives equal weights). The Map is constructed using composite index for each 
dimension.
The overall corporate sector stability indicator is a weighted average of 5 dimensions. The weights are obtained 
using principal component analysis (PCA). The derived weights for 5 dimensions are as follows:
Profi tability Leverage Sustainability Liquidity Turn-Over
25% 25% 25% 10% 15%
Systemic Liquidity Index
Systemic liquidity in the fi nancial system refers to the liquidity scenario in the banking sector, non-banking 
fi nancial sector, the corporate sector and the prevailing foreign currency liquidity. Current needs for liquidity are 
also infl uenced by the expectations about the availability of funds and their rates in future. The Systemic Liquidity 
Index (SLI) was constructed using the following four indicators representing various segments of the market:
Weighted Average Call Rate minus RBI Repo Rate
3 month Commercial Paper (CP) Rate minus 3 month Certifi cate of Deposits (CD) Rate
3 month CD Rate minus 3 month Forward Implied Deposit Rate
Weighted Average Call Rate minus 3 Month Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Rate
The SLI was derived as a simple average of the Standard normal or Variance-equal transformed values of the 
above mentioned indicators.
Banking Stability Map and Indicator
The Banking Stability Map and Indicator (BSI) present an overall assessment of changes in underlying conditions 
and risk factors that have a bearing on stability of the banking sector during a period. Following ratios are used 
for construction of each composite index:
Ratios used for construction of Banking Stability Map and Banking Stability Indicator
Dimension Ratios
Soundness CRAR # Tier-I Capital to Tier-II Capital 
#
Leverage ratio as Total-Assets to Capital and Reserves
Asset-Quality Net NPAs to Total-Advances Gross NPAs to Total-Advances Sub-Standard-advances to 
gross NPAs #
Restructured-Standard-Advances 
to Standard-Advances
Profi tability Return on Assets # Net Interest Margin # Growth in Profi t #
Liquidity Liquid-Assets to Total-Assets 
#
Customer-Deposits to Total-
Assets #
Non-Bank-Advances to 
Customer-Deposits
Deposits maturing within-1-year 
to Total Deposits
Effi ciency Cost to Income Business (Credit + Deposits) to staff expenses # Staff Expenses to Total Expenses
 # Negatively related to risk.
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The fi ve composite indices represent the fi ve dimensions of Soundness, Asset-quality, Profi tability, Liquidity 
and Effi ciency. Each composite index, representing a dimension of bank functioning, takes values between 
zero (minimum) and 1 (maximum). Each index is a relative measure during the sample period used for its 
construction, where a high value means the risk in that dimension is high. Therefore, an increase in the value of 
the index in any particular dimension indicates an increase in risk in that dimension for that period as compared 
to other periods. For each ratio used for a dimension, a weighted average for the banking sector is derived, where 
the weights are the ratio of individual bank asset to total banking system assets. Each index is normalised for 
the sample period as ‘Ratio-on-a-given-date minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period divided by Maximum-value-
in-sample-period minus Minimum-value-in-sample-period’. A composite index of each dimension is calculated 
as a weighted average of normalised ratios used for that dimension, where the weights are based on the marks 
assigned for assessment for CAMELS rating. Based on the individual composite index for each dimension, the 
Banking Stability Indicator is constructed as a simple average of these fi ve composite sub-indices.
Banking Stability Measures (BSMs) – Distress Dependency Analysis
In order to model distress dependency, methodology described by Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) has been 
followed. First, the banking system has been conceptualised as a portfolio of banks(BIs). Then, the PoD of the 
individual banks, comprising the portfolio, has been inferred from equity prices. Subsequently, using such PoDs 
as inputs (exogenous variables) and employing the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing 
(CIMDO) methodology (Segoviano, 2006), which is a non-parametric approach based on cross-entropy, the banking 
system’s portfolio multivariate density (BSMD) have been derived. Lastly, from the BSMD a set of conditional 
PoDs of specifi c pairs of BIs, and the banking system’s joint PoD(JPoD) are estimated.
The BSMD and thus, the estimated conditional probabilities and the JPoD, embed the banks’ distress dependency. 
This captures the linear (correlation) and non-linear dependencies among the BIs in the portfolio, and allows for 
these to change throughout the economic cycle. These are key advantages over traditional risk models that most 
of the time incorporate only correlations, and assume that they are constant throughout the economic cycle.
The BSMs uses the following indicators of distress dependency:
Banking Stability Index (BSI): The expected number of banks that could became distressed given that at least one 
bank has become distressed.
Toxicity Index (TI): The average probability that a bank under distress may cause distress to another bank in the 
system.
Vulnerability Index (VI): The average probability of a bank coming under distress given distress in other banks 
in the system.
Network Analysis
Matrix algebra is at the core of network analysis, which is essentially an analysis of bilateral exposures between 
entities in the fi nancial sector. Each institution’s lending and borrowings with all others in the system are 
plotted in a square matrix and are then mapped in a network graph. The network model uses various statistical 
measures to gauge the level of interconnectedness in the system. Some of the most important are as follows:
Connectivity: This is a statistic that measures the extent of links between the nodes relative to all possible links 
in a complete graph.
Cluster Coeffi cient: Clustering in networks measures how interconnected each node is. Specifi cally, there 
should be an increased probability that two of a node’s neighbours (banks’ counterparties in case of the fi nancial 
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network) are also neighbours themselves. A high clustering coeffi cient for the network corresponds with high 
local interconnectedness prevailing in the system.
Shortest Path Length: This gives the average number of directed links between a node and each of the other 
nodes in the network. Those nodes with the shortest path can be identifi ed as hubs in the system.
In-betweeness centrality: This statistic reports how the shortest path lengths pass through a particular node.
Eigen vector measure of centrality: Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node (bank) in a 
network. It describes how connected a node’s neighbours are and attempts to capture more than just the number 
of out degrees or direct ‘neighbours’ a node has. The algorithm assigns relative centrality scores to all nodes in 
the network and a bank’s centrality score is proportional to the sum of the centrality scores of all nodes to which 
it is connected. In general, for an NxN matrix there will be N different eigen values, for which an eigen vector 
solution exists. Each bank has a unique eigen value, which indicates its importance in the system. This measure 
is used in the network analysis to establish the systemic importance of a bank and by far it is the most crucial 
indicator.
Tiered Network Structures: Typically, fi nancial networks tend to exhibit a tiered structure. A tiered structure is 
one where different institutions have different degrees or levels of connectivity with others in the network. In 
the present analysis, the most connected banks (based on their eigen vector measure of centrality) are in the 
inner most core. Banks are then placed in the mid core, outer core and the periphery (the respective concentric 
circles around the centre in the diagrams), based on their level of relative connectivity. The range of connectivity 
of the banks is defi ned as a ratio of each bank’s in degree and out degree divided by that of the most connected 
bank. Banks that are ranked in the top 10 percentile of this ratio constitute the inner core. This is followed by 
a mid core of banks ranked between 90 and 70 percentile and a 3rd tier of banks ranked between 40 and 70 
percentile. Banks with connectivity ratio of less than 40 per cent are categorised as the periphery.
Solvency Contagion analysis
The contagion analysis is basically a stress test where the gross loss to the banking system owing to a domino 
effect of one or more bank failing is ascertained. We follow the round by round or sequential algorithm for 
simulating contagion that is now well known from Furfi ne (2003). Starting with a trigger bank ‘i’ that fails at time 
0, we denote the set of banks that go into distress at each round or iteration by Dq, q= 1,2, …For this analysis, 
a bank is considered to be in distress when its core CRAR goes below 6 per cent. The net receivables have been 
considered as loss for the receiving bank.
Liquidity Contagion analysis
While the solvency contagion analysis assesses potential loss to the system owing to failure of a net borrower, 
liquidity contagion estimates potential loss to the system due to the failure of a net lender. The analysis is 
conducted on gross exposures between banks. The exposures include fund based and derivatives. The basic 
assumption for the analysis is that a bank will initially dip into its liquidity reserves or buffers to tide over a 
liquidity stress caused by the failure of a large net lender. The items considered under liquidity reserves are (a) 
excess CRR balance; (b) excess SLR balance; (c) available marginal standing facility and (d) available export credit 
refi nance. If a bank is able to meet the stress with the liquidity buffers alone, then there is no further contagion.
However, if the liquidity buffers alone are not suffi cient, then a bank will call in all loans that are ‘callable’, 
resulting in a contagion. For the analysis only short term assets like money lent in the call market and other very 
short term loans are taken as callable. Following this, a bank may survive or may be liquidated. In this case there 
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might be instances where a bank may survive by calling in loans, but in turn might propagate a further contagion 
causing other banks to come under duress. The second assumption used is that when a bank is liquidated, the 
funds lent by the bank are called in on a gross basis, whereas when a bank calls in a short term loan without 
being liquidated, the loan is called in on a net basis (on the assumption that the counterparty is likely to fi rst 
reduce its short term lending against the same counterparty).
Estimation of Losses: Expected Loss, Unexpected Loss and Expected Shortfall of SCBs
The following standard defi nitions have been used for estimation of these losses:
Expected Loss (EL) :  The EL is the average credit loss that the banking system expects from their credit 
exposure.
Unexpected Loss (UL) :  The UL at 100(1-) per cent-level of signifi cance is the loss that may occur at the 
-quantile of the loss distribution.
Expected Shortfall (ES) : When the distributions of loss (Z) are continuous, expected shortfall at the 100(1-) 
per cent confi dence level ( ES (Z) ) is defi ned as, ES (Z) = E[Z – ZVaR (Z)]. Hence, 
Expected shortfall is the conditional expectation of loss given that the loss is beyond 
the VaR level. 
These losses were estimated as: Loss = PD X LGD X EAD
Where, EAD = Exposure at Default, is the total advances of the banking system. EAD includes only on-balance 
sheet items as PD was derived only for on balance sheet exposures.
 LGD = Loss Given Default. Under baseline scenario, the average LGD was taken as 60 per cent as per 
the RBI guidelines on ‘Capital Adequacy – The IRB Approach to Calculate Capital Requirement 
for Credit Risk’. LGD was taken at 65 per cent and 70 per cent under medium and severe macro-
economic conditions, respectively.
 PD = Probability of Default. PD was defi ned as gross non-performing advances to total advances ratio. 
Because of unavailability of data on number of default accounts, the size of default accounts (i.e. 
NPA amount) has been used for derivation of PDs.
The above losses viz., EL, UL and ES, were estimated by using a simulated PD distribution. As a fi rst step; an 
empirical distribution of the PD was estimated using Kernel Density Estimate, second; using the empirically 
estimated probability density function, 20000 random numbers were drawn based on Monte Carlo Simulation 
and fi nally, for calculation of expected loss, unexpected loss and expected shortfall, PDs were taken as average 
PD, 99.9 per cent VaR of PD and average PD beyond 99.9 per cent loss region, respectively.
Macro Stress Testing
To ascertain the resilience of banks against macroeconomic shocks, macro stress test for credit risk was conducted. 
Here, the credit risk indicator was modeled as function of macroeconomic variables, using various econometric 
models that relate banking system aggregate to the macroeconomic variables. The time series econometric 
models being used are; (i) multivariate regression in terms of the slippage ratio; (ii) aggregate VAR using slippage 
ratio; (iii) quantile regression of slippage ratio, (iv) multivariate panel regression on bank-group wise slippage 
ratio data; and (v) multivariate regressions for sectoral NPAs. The banking system aggregates includes current 
and lagged values of slippage ratio, while macroeconomic variables include GDP growth, short term interest rate 
(call rate), WPI infl ation, exports-to-GDP ratio , gross fi scal defi cit-to-GDP ratio  and REER.
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While the multivariate regression allows evaluating the impact of selected macroeconomic variables on the 
banking system’s NPA and capital, the VAR model refl ects the impact of the overall economic stress situation on 
the banks’ capital and NPA ratio, which also take into account feed-back effect. In these methods, conditional 
mean of slippage1 ratio is estimated and assumed that the impact of macro variables on credit quality will 
remain same irrespective of the level of the credit quality, which may not always be true. In order to relax this 
assumption, quantile regression has been adapted to project credit quality, in which, in place of conditional 
mean the conditional quantile has been estimated.
The Modelling Framework
The following multivariate models were run to estimate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the GNPA ratio/ 
slippage ratio (SR)2:
 Aggregate banking system multivariate regression
The analysis was carried out on slippage ratio at the aggregate level for the commercial banking system as 
a whole.
 
Where, 
 Vector AutoRegression (VAR)
 In notational form, mean-adjusted VAR of order p (VAR(p)) can be written as
Where,   is a (K×1) vector of variables at time t, the Ai (i=1,2,…p) are fi xed (K×K) coeffi cient 
matrices and  is a K-dimensional white noise or innovation process.
In order to estimate, VAR system, slippage ratio, call rate, infl ation, growth and REER were selected. The 
appropriate order of VAR has been selected based on minimum information criteria as well as other 
diagnostics and suitable order was found to be two. Accordingly, VAR of order 2 (VAR(2)) was estimated and 
stability of the model was checked based on roots of AR characteristic polynomial. Since, all roots are found 
to be inside the unit circle, this selected model was found to be fulfi lling the stability condition. The impact 
of various macroeconomic shocks was determined using impulse response function of the selected VAR.
 Quantile Regression
In order to estimate slippage ratio at desired level of conditional quantile, following quantile regression at 
median (which is the present quantile of slippage ratio) was used:
 
 Where, 
1 Slippages are the fresh accretion to NPAs during a period. Slippage Ratio = Fresh NPAs / Standard Advances at the beginning of period.
2 Slippage ratio, exports/GDP, and the call rate are seasonally adjusted.
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 Bank-group wise panel fi xed-effect regression
 Bank-group wise slippage ratios were estimated using the following fi x effect panel regression.
 where,  is the bank-group specifi c parameter and .
 Sectoral multivariate regression
The impact of macroeconomic shocks on various sectors was assessed by employing multivariate regression 
models using aggregate NPA ratio for each sector separately. The dependent variables consisted of lagged NPAs, 
sectoral GDP growth, infl ation, and short-term interest rate.
Derivation of the NPAs from the slippage ratios, which were projected from the above mentioned credit risk 
econometric models, were based on the following assumptions: credit growth of 15 per cent; recovery rate of 
7.5 per cent, 5.7 per cent, 5.7 per cent and 6.3 per cent during March, June, September and December quarters, 
respectively; write-offs rate of 6.5 per cent, 3.0 per cent, 2.3 per cent and 4.6 per cent, during March, June, 
September and December respectively.
There are various components of profi t after tax (PAT) of banks, like, interest income other income, operating 
expenses, provisions, etc., hence, these components are projected using different time series econometric models 
(as given below) and fi nally PAT was estimated using the following identity:
PAT = NII + 001 – OE – Provisions – Income Tax
Where; NII is Net Interest Income, OOI is Other Operating Income and OE is Operating Expenses.
Net Interest Income (NII): The NII which is the difference between interest income and interest expenses is 
projected using the following regression equation;
Where,  LNII is log of NII. LNGDP_SA is seasonally adjusted log of nominal GDP at factor 
cost. Adv_Gr is y-o-y growth rate of advances. Spread is the difference between average interest rate earned by the 
interest earning assets and average interest paid on the interest bearing liabilities.
Other Operating Income (OOI): The OOI of SCBs was projected using the following regression;
Where, 
Operating Expenses (OE): The OE of SCBs was projected using Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model.
Provision: The required provisioning was projected using the following regression;
Where,  P_Adv is provisions to total advances ratio. RGDP_Gr is y-o-y growth rate of real 
GDP. GNPA is gross non performing advances to total advances ratio. Dummy is a time dummy.
Income Tax: The required income tax was taken as 32 per cent of the profi t before tax, which is based on the past 
trend of ratio of income tax to profi t before tax.
Finally, impact on CRAR was estimated based on the PAT estimated as mentioned above. RWA growth is 
assumed as 17.5 per cent. The regulatory capital growth is assumed to remain at the minimum by assuming 
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minimum mandated transfer of 25 per cent of the profi t to the reserves account. The projected values of the 
ratio of the non-performing advances were translated into capital ratios using the “balance sheet approach”, 
by which capital in the balance sheet is affected via the provisions and net profi ts.
Single Factor Sensitivity Analysis – Stress Testing
As a part of quarterly surveillance, stress tests are conducted covering credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk 
etc. Resilience of the commercial banks in response to these shocks is studied. The analysis is done on individual 
scheduled commercial bank as well as on the aggregated-system.
Credit Risk
To ascertain the resilience of banks, the credit portfolio was given a shock by increasing NPA levels, for the entire 
portfolio. For testing the credit concentration risk, default of the top individual borrower(s) and the largest group 
borrower was assumed. The analysis was carried out both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual bank 
level, based on supervisory data as on September 30, 2013. The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across 
sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. 
The provisioning norms used for these stress tests were based on existing average prescribed provisioning for 
different asset categories. The provisioning requirements were taken as 25, 75 and 100 per cent for sub-standard, 
doubtful and loss advances, respectively. These norms were applied on the additional NPAs, calculated under a 
stress-scenario. As a result of assumed increase in NPAs, loss of income on the additional NPAs for one quarter 
was also included in total losses in addition to additional provisioning requirements. The estimated provisioning 
requirements so derived were deduced from banks’ capital and stressed capital adequacy ratios were derived.
Interest rate risk
The fall in value of the portfolio or income losses due to the shifting of INR yield curve are accounted for the 
total loss of the banks because of the assumed shock. The estimated total losses so derived were reduced from 
the banks’ capital.
For interest rate risk in the banking book, Duration Analysis approach was considered, for computation of 
the valuation impact (portfolio losses) on the investment portfolio. The portfolio losses on investments were 
calculated for each time bucket based on the applied shocks. The resultant losses/gains were used to derive 
the impacted CRAR. The valuation impact for the tests on banking book was calculated under the assumption 
that the HTM portfolio would be marked to market. In a separate exercise for interest rate shocks in trading 
book, the valuation losses were calculated for each time bucket on the interest bearing assets using duration 
approach.
Liquidity Risk
The aim of liquidity stress tests is to assess the ability of a bank to withstand unexpected liquidity drain without 
taking recourse to any outside liquidity support. The analysis is done as at end-September 2013. Various scenarios 
depict different proportions (depending on the type of deposits) of unexpected deposit withdrawals on account 
of sudden loss of depositors’ confi dence and assess the adequacy of liquid assets available to fund them.
Assumptions in the liquidity stress test are as follows:
• It is assumed that banks would meet stressed withdrawal of deposits through sale of liquid assets only.
• The sale of investments is done with a hair cut of 10 per cent of their market value.
• The stress test is done on a static mode.
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Stress Testing of Derivatives Portfolio of Select Banks
The stress testing exercise focused on the derivatives portfolio of a representative sample set of top 24 banks in 
terms of notional value of derivatives portfolio. Each bank in the sample was asked to assess the impact of stress 
conditions on their respective derivatives portfolios.
In case of domestic banks, the derivatives portfolio of both domestic and overseas operations was included. In 
case of foreign banks, only the domestic (i.e. Indian) position was considered for the exercise. For derivatives 
trade where hedge effectiveness was established was exempted from the stress tests, while all other trades were 
included.
The stress scenarios incorporated four sensitivity tests consisting of the spot USD/INR rate and domestic interest 
rates as parameters
Shocks for Sensitivity Analysis
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 1
Overnight +2.5 percentage points
Upto 1yr +1.5 percentage points
Above 1yr +1.0 percentage points
Domestic Interest Rates
Shock 2
Overnight -2.5 percentage points
Upto 1yr -1.5 percentage points
Above 1yr -1.0 percentage points
Exchange rates
Shock 3 USD/INR +20 per cent
Exchange Rates
Shock 4 USD/INR -20 per cent
Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks
Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their asset 
portfolio as at end-September 2013. The tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on 
CRAR was studied under four different scenarios. The assumed scenarios were as under:
 Scenario I: 50 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into sub-standard advances).
 Scenario II: 50 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into loss advances).
 Scenario III: 100 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into sub-standard advances).
 Scenario IV: 100 per cent increase in GNPA (classifi ed into loss advances).
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Liquidity Risk
Liquidity stress test based on cash fl ow basis in 1-28 days time bucket was also conducted, where mismatch 
[negative gap (cash infl ow less than cash outfl ow)] exceeding 20 per cent of outfl ow was considered stressful.
 Scenario I: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 50 per cent (no change in cash infl ows).
 Scenario II: Cash out fl ows in 1-28 days time bucket goes up by 100 per cent (no change in cash infl ows).
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI)
Credit Risk
Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on Non-Banking Financial Companies (includes both Deposits Taking 
and Non-Deposit taking and Systemically Important) using their asset portfolio as at end-September 2013. The 
tests were based on single factor sensitivity analysis. The impact on CRAR was studied under two different 
scenarios;
 Scenario I: GNPA increased two times from the current level.
 Scenario II: GNPA increased 5 times from the current level.
The assumed increase in NPAs was distributed across sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories in the same 
proportion as prevailing in the existing stock of NPAs. The additional provisioning requirement was adjusted 
from the current capital position. The stress was conducted at individual NBFCs as well as at an aggregate level.
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